This article evaluates the potential influence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection in pregnant women on the development of coronavirus disease 2019 in neonates and discusses the possibility of mother-to-child vertical transmission of SARS-CoV-2. With reference to related articles published up to now and the information on official websites, a retrospective review was performed for the clinical manifestations and laboratory examination results of the neonates born to the mothers with infection during pregnancy during the epidemics of severe acute respiratory syndrome and Middle East respiratory syndrome and after the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 infection since December 2019. Based on the limited data, there is no conclusive evidence for mother-to-child vertical transmission of coronavirus disease 2019, and more cases need to be collected for further evaluation.
Betacoronavirus ; Child ; Coronavirus Infections ; Female ; Humans ; Infant, Newborn ; Infectious Disease Transmission, Vertical ; Pandemics ; Pneumonia, Viral ; Pregnancy ; Pregnancy Complications, Infectious ; Pregnancy Outcome ; Retrospective Studies ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

Betacoronavirus ; Coronavirus Infections ; epidemiology ; transmission ; Disease Outbreaks ; Humans ; Pandemics ; Pneumonia, Viral ; epidemiology ; transmission ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology

OBJECTIVETo develop a new transmission tracking analysis technique during incubation period of respiratory infectious diseases, and to discuss its practical value in the field survey of infectious diseases.

METHODSThe classical epidemiological theory was integrated with geographic information system. The transmission tracking analysis technique was established based on the modeling platform ArcGIS Engine Developer Kit 9.3, using the techniques of address matching, shortest path analysis and buffer analysis, and programming by Visual C++. Eight serious sever acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases in Shanghai in year 2003 were then chose as prototype to set up the test cases A-H. The electronic map and population density data were separately collected from Institute of Surveying and Mapping in Shanghai and Shanghai statistical yearbook 2003, to calculate and explore the parameters as length of transmission path, area of buffer zone and key departments by single and multi case analysis module.

RESULTSThe single case transmission tracking analysis showed that the length of transmission track of case A was 129.89 km during April 25th to 29th in 2003, including 12 tracing point and 108 intimate contacts, and the total area of buffer zone was 7.11 km(2) including 81 important institutes, naming 72 schools, 6 kindergartens and 3 gerocomiums. The multi-case transmission tracking analysis showed that the 8 cases shared 5 tracks without any temporal communication. However, there was a spatial communication whose length was 1.42 km and area was 0.60 km(2). There were no important institutes found in this communication area.

CONCLUSIONTransmission tracking technique is practicable and efficient to trace the source of infection, analyze the transmission tracks, establish the isolation buffer area and explore the important geographic positions in epidemiological investigation.

Contact Tracing ; methods ; Disease Transmission, Infectious ; statistics & numerical data ; Epidemiological Monitoring ; Geographic Information Systems ; Humans ; Infectious Disease Incubation Period ; Respiratory Tract Infections ; transmission ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; transmission ; Software

Animals ; Chiroptera ; virology ; Coronavirus ; classification ; genetics ; isolation & purification ; Coronavirus Infections ; transmission ; virology ; Databases, Genetic ; Genome, Viral ; Humans ; Male ; Middle Aged ; Middle East ; Phylogeny ; SARS Virus ; classification ; genetics ; isolation & purification ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; virology

OBJECTIVETo evaluate the infectivity of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) during its incubation period by investigating chains of transmission and individuals isolated for medical observation with a view to providing scientific evidence for updating protocols of medical isolation.

METHODSIndividuals related with the two SARS chains of transmission in Beijing in 2003 and a group of individuals isolated for medical observation in Haidian district of Beijing during the SARS outbreak were selected as subjects of study. Contactors with SARS patients and those with symptom development following the contacts were investigated via questionnaire. Serum samples were collected from super transmitters and tested for SARS-CoV antibody by neutralization test and enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA).

RESULTSA total of 1112 contactors were investigated in three surveys. Of them, 669 had a history of close contact with symptomatic SARS patients, 101 developed symptoms with a rate of 15.1%, 363 had a history of close contact with patients in their incubation period, none of whom developed symptoms (0%). Serum samples were collected from 32 highly-exposed individuals, of whom 13 developing SARS symptoms after contact had serum samples positive for SARS-CoV antibody. Samples collected from the asymptomatic contactors were all negative for SARS-CoV antibody.

CONCLUSIONSARS cases are infectious only during their symptomatic period and are non-infectious during the incubation period. Isolation for medical observation should be placed for individuals who are in close contact with symptomatic SARS patients. The results of our study are of decisive significance for the Ministry of Health to the definition of SARS close contactor.

China ; epidemiology ; Disease Outbreaks ; Humans ; Infectious Disease Incubation Period ; SARS Virus ; physiology ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology

OBJECTIVETo detect serve acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and SARS-like-CoV in fruit bats captured in Guangzhou and its vicinity.

METHODSTotally 927 bats of 9 species (Cynopterus sphinx, Rousettus leschenaulti, Miniopterus schreibersi, Hipposideros pratti, Rhinolophusasinicus, Scotophilusakuhlii, Hipposideros Pomona, Rhinolophus affinis, and Rhinolophus pusillus) captured in Guangzhou and its vicinity from September 2004 to November 2005 were available for this investigation, from which 3,043 samples (813 throat swasb, 524 sera, 853 lung tissues and 853 colorectal tissue specimens) were obtained. SARS-Cov and SARS-like-CoV were detected in these specimens using diagnostic kit for novel coronavirus N protein (ELISA), SARS-CoV Virus RNA detection kit, fluorescence PCR, Genchip, RT-PCR and cell isolation culture methods.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONNo SARS-CoV and SARS-like-CoV were detected in the 3043 samples, indicating the current absence of SARS-CoV and SARS-like-CoV in the bats captured in Guangzhou and its vicinity.

Animals ; China ; epidemiology ; Chiroptera ; virology ; Disease Vectors ; Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay ; Humans ; Nucleocapsid Proteins ; metabolism ; RNA, Viral ; genetics ; Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction ; SARS Virus ; genetics ; isolation & purification ; metabolism ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology

OBJECTIVETo summarize lessons learned from an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in China during the spring of 2004.

METHODSData of SARS cases were officially reported by Beijing Municipal Center for Disease Control and Prevention (BCDC) and Anhui Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention (APCDC) and results of epidemiological investigations were collected and analyzed.

RESULTSThree generations of 11 cases of SARS were identified during the outbreak. Initial two cases were most likely to be infected in Diarrhea Virus Laboratory of National Institute of Virology, China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and main mode of transmission was direct contact with SARS patients. Delay in detecting initial case resulted in spread of the illness at hospitals and communities with two generations of secondary cases.

CONCLUSIONSSARS outbreak in 2004 has yielded following lessons for public health globally. (1) Lab bio-safety programs should be made and should be strictly abided by. Studies in highly pathogenic viruses such as SARS coronavirus should be utmost cautious. (2) Management systems of occupational exposure to virus and disease surveillance need to be strengthened to take all risk factors into account so as to detect potential patients with infectious disease as early as possible.

China ; epidemiology ; Disease Outbreaks ; Female ; Humans ; Male ; Occupational Exposure ; prevention & control ; Occupational Health ; Retrospective Studies ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; transmission

INTRODUCTIONIt has been noted that SARS transmission is characterised by a few super-spreading events (SSEs) giving rise to a disproportionate number of secondary cases. Clinical and environmental features surrounding the index cases involved were compared with cases in non- SSEs.

MATERIALS AND METHODSData on 231 cases of probable SARS admitted to Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) were used. Index cases directly causing 10 or more secondary cases were classified as having been involved in SSEs; all others were defined as non-SSEs.

RESULTSOnly 5 cases were involved in SSEs; all 5 were isolated on day 5 of illness or later, and spent at least a brief period in a non-isolation ward; in contrast, amongst the 226 non-SSE cases, only 40.7% and 4.0% were isolated late and admitted to non-isolation wards respectively, and only 3.1% had both these environmental features present; the differences were highly significant (P = 0.012, P <0.001 and P <0.001 by Fisher's Exact test). When compared to 7 non-SSE cases with delayed isolation and an admission to non-isolation wards, SSEs were more likely to have co-morbid disease or require ICU care at time of isolation (P = 0.045 for both factors).

CONCLUSIONSSEs were likely due to a conglomeration of environmental factors of delayed isolation and admission to a non-isolation ward, coupled with severe disease stage at time of isolation.

Adult ; Female ; Humans ; Male ; Middle Aged ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology ; transmission ; Singapore ; epidemiology

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was an unknown disease barely 3 years ago. After the World Health Organization declared the world SARS-free on 5 July 2003, there were episodic recurrences of SARS between September 2003 and May 2004, including 4 cases of laboratory-acquired SARS. SARS posed a mammoth challenge because of the impact of nosocomial transmission on healthcare manpower and facilities, and the resources needed for controlling and preventing further spread. Through worldwide scientific collaboration, the medical community has made much progress in unraveling its enigma, though much more needs to be discovered. This paper highlights how we can apply our knowledge of its epidemiology, mode of transmission, clinical course, ICU admission, complications, predictors of poor outcome, treatment and infection control to help us avert a catastrophic outbreak, and to manage our resources and patients. SARS preparedness and response planning must be flexible and dynamic so that appropriate measures can be implemented as an outbreak progresses. Even if SARS does not reemerge, the experience gained from such planning is valuable in preparing for threats of bioterrorism or a global avian influenza A (H5N1) virus pandemic.
Cross Infection ; prevention & control ; Disease Outbreaks ; prevention & control ; Disease Transmission, Infectious ; prevention & control ; Global Health ; Humans ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology

Following the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, a large number of clinical and environmental samples containing/potentially containing SARS coronavirus (SARSCoV) as well as SARS-CoV stocks were retained in clinical and research laboratories. The importance of laboratory biosafety was demonstrated by the occurrence of laboratory incidents in Singapore, Taiwan and Beijing. It is imperative that safe practice and techniques, safety equipment and appropriate facility design should be in place to reduce or eliminate exposure of laboratory workers, other persons and the outside environment to SARS-CoV containing materials. Discussion on laboratory containment of SARS-CoV was initiated in Hong Kong in August 2003. It was agreed that an inventory of all specimens with the potential presence of SARS-CoV collected for any diagnostic or research purposes from November 2002 to July 2003 should be established in each laboratory. They should be stored in a secure place at the appropriate biosafety level with access control. Un-needed samples collected during the period should be destroyed. These laboratories should be audited to ensure inventories are updated. The audit should include safety and security measures to detect irregularities. Any laboratory accidents involving materials suspected of containing SARS-CoV should be reported to the authorities and all personnel exposed closely followed medically. A contingency plan should be in place in the laboratory and a drill conducted regularly to test its efficacy. By January 2004, all clinical laboratories performing SARS-CoV testing in Hong Kong set up inventories to document location and types of SARS-CoV containing materials retained in their laboratory. Audits of these laboratories in 2004 showed that laboratory safety and containment requirements as recommended were generally met.
Disease Outbreaks ; Disease Transmission, Infectious ; Humans ; Risk Factors ; SARS Virus ; isolation & purification ; pathogenicity ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology ; virology ; Singapore ; epidemiology ; Specimen Handling