Background: This study evaluated the practicability of the suicide rate reduction target set by the current national suicide prevention policy in Korea, the fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention (2023–2027). This policy aims to lower the suicide rate from 26/100,000 in 2021 to 18.2/100,000 by 2027. Methods: We utilized monthly suicide statistics data from 2011 onwards. Using Bayesian regression and Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models, we conducted interrupted time series analyses to estimate the effect of the previous policy, the National Action Plan for Suicide Prevention (2018–2022), on suicide rates. We assumed this as the additional suicide reduction expected from the current policy. We generated point predictions and simulations for suicide rates from 2023 to 2027 using Bayesian regression and ARIMA models. Results: The interrupted time series analyses did not reveal a significant reduction in suicides attributable to the previous policy. Point predictions from the two models indicated that the suicide rate would remain approximately 24/100,000 in 2027. Almost all of the simulations of the 2027 suicide rate did not meet the policy target of 18.2/100,000. Conclusion The findings suggest that the Korean government’s suicide rate reduction target for 2027 is likely unattainable based on current trends and the limited effectiveness of previous policies. The objectives of suicide prevention policies should be evidence-based, attainable, and accountable.

Background: This study evaluated the practicability of the suicide rate reduction target set by the current national suicide prevention policy in Korea, the fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention (2023–2027). This policy aims to lower the suicide rate from 26/100,000 in 2021 to 18.2/100,000 by 2027. Methods: We utilized monthly suicide statistics data from 2011 onwards. Using Bayesian regression and Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models, we conducted interrupted time series analyses to estimate the effect of the previous policy, the National Action Plan for Suicide Prevention (2018–2022), on suicide rates. We assumed this as the additional suicide reduction expected from the current policy. We generated point predictions and simulations for suicide rates from 2023 to 2027 using Bayesian regression and ARIMA models. Results: The interrupted time series analyses did not reveal a significant reduction in suicides attributable to the previous policy. Point predictions from the two models indicated that the suicide rate would remain approximately 24/100,000 in 2027. Almost all of the simulations of the 2027 suicide rate did not meet the policy target of 18.2/100,000. Conclusion The findings suggest that the Korean government’s suicide rate reduction target for 2027 is likely unattainable based on current trends and the limited effectiveness of previous policies. The objectives of suicide prevention policies should be evidence-based, attainable, and accountable.

Background: This study evaluated the practicability of the suicide rate reduction target set by the current national suicide prevention policy in Korea, the fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention (2023–2027). This policy aims to lower the suicide rate from 26/100,000 in 2021 to 18.2/100,000 by 2027. Methods: We utilized monthly suicide statistics data from 2011 onwards. Using Bayesian regression and Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models, we conducted interrupted time series analyses to estimate the effect of the previous policy, the National Action Plan for Suicide Prevention (2018–2022), on suicide rates. We assumed this as the additional suicide reduction expected from the current policy. We generated point predictions and simulations for suicide rates from 2023 to 2027 using Bayesian regression and ARIMA models. Results: The interrupted time series analyses did not reveal a significant reduction in suicides attributable to the previous policy. Point predictions from the two models indicated that the suicide rate would remain approximately 24/100,000 in 2027. Almost all of the simulations of the 2027 suicide rate did not meet the policy target of 18.2/100,000. Conclusion The findings suggest that the Korean government’s suicide rate reduction target for 2027 is likely unattainable based on current trends and the limited effectiveness of previous policies. The objectives of suicide prevention policies should be evidence-based, attainable, and accountable.

Background: This study evaluated the practicability of the suicide rate reduction target set by the current national suicide prevention policy in Korea, the fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention (2023–2027). This policy aims to lower the suicide rate from 26/100,000 in 2021 to 18.2/100,000 by 2027. Methods: We utilized monthly suicide statistics data from 2011 onwards. Using Bayesian regression and Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models, we conducted interrupted time series analyses to estimate the effect of the previous policy, the National Action Plan for Suicide Prevention (2018–2022), on suicide rates. We assumed this as the additional suicide reduction expected from the current policy. We generated point predictions and simulations for suicide rates from 2023 to 2027 using Bayesian regression and ARIMA models. Results: The interrupted time series analyses did not reveal a significant reduction in suicides attributable to the previous policy. Point predictions from the two models indicated that the suicide rate would remain approximately 24/100,000 in 2027. Almost all of the simulations of the 2027 suicide rate did not meet the policy target of 18.2/100,000. Conclusion The findings suggest that the Korean government’s suicide rate reduction target for 2027 is likely unattainable based on current trends and the limited effectiveness of previous policies. The objectives of suicide prevention policies should be evidence-based, attainable, and accountable.

Background: The number of general cosmetic practitioners impersonating dermatologists in Korea has increased, leading to serious harm that is significant enough to attract the attention of health authorities, which dermatologists are deeply concerned about. Objective: We conducted a survey targeting dermatologists to gather their opinions on the behavior, problems, and countermeasures of general cosmetic practitioners disguising themselves as dermatologists. Methods: A total of 280 dermatologists completed the survey between January and February 2024. The questions covered demographic characteristics, experiences of cosmetic general practitioners falsely introduced themselves as dermatologists, complications experienced by patients who received treatment after being mistaken for a dermatologist, the seriousness of the problem for cosmetic general practitioners impersonating dermatologists, and the relationship between the shortage of essential medical personnel and the phenomenon of cosmetic general practitioners disguising themselves as dermatologists. Results: Despite cases in which cosmetic general practitioners impersonate dermatologists, most dermatologists have not responded appropriately in many instances. Dermatologists have reported many cases of complications after receiving dermatological treatment from such cosmetic general practitioners. Most dermatologists are concerned about the serious problems of general cosmetic practitioners, disguising themselves as dermatologists and anticipating many adverse effects. Conclusion We believe that we need to pool our wisdom to solve these problems and expect that this study will provide valuable basic data for solving these problems in the dermatology and medical environments of Korea.

Background: The number of general cosmetic practitioners impersonating dermatologists in Korea has increased, leading to serious harm that is significant enough to attract the attention of health authorities, which dermatologists are deeply concerned about. Objective: We conducted a survey targeting dermatologists to gather their opinions on the behavior, problems, and countermeasures of general cosmetic practitioners disguising themselves as dermatologists. Methods: A total of 280 dermatologists completed the survey between January and February 2024. The questions covered demographic characteristics, experiences of cosmetic general practitioners falsely introduced themselves as dermatologists, complications experienced by patients who received treatment after being mistaken for a dermatologist, the seriousness of the problem for cosmetic general practitioners impersonating dermatologists, and the relationship between the shortage of essential medical personnel and the phenomenon of cosmetic general practitioners disguising themselves as dermatologists. Results: Despite cases in which cosmetic general practitioners impersonate dermatologists, most dermatologists have not responded appropriately in many instances. Dermatologists have reported many cases of complications after receiving dermatological treatment from such cosmetic general practitioners. Most dermatologists are concerned about the serious problems of general cosmetic practitioners, disguising themselves as dermatologists and anticipating many adverse effects. Conclusion We believe that we need to pool our wisdom to solve these problems and expect that this study will provide valuable basic data for solving these problems in the dermatology and medical environments of Korea.

Objectives: This study examined the shifts in the suicide trends in Korea during the initial phase of the Fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention, using interrupted time series analyses. Methods: Interrupted time series analyses were performed using the monthly suicide data from January 2011 to April 2024. Quasi-Poisson regression models were applied to evaluate the changes in the level and slope of the suicide trend before and after policy implementation. The Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Prophet models were used to compare the actual and predicted counterfactual numbers of suicides during the policy period. Results: The quasi-Poisson regression model revealed a significant change in the trend of suicides among men, with an increasing slope during the policy period. For total suicides, the ARIMA and Prophet models suggested that the actual number of suicides was significantly higher than the counterfactual number during the policy period, with excess suicides averaging between 113 and 150 per month. The actual number of suicides among men was significantly higher than the counterfactual number during the policy period, with excess suicides averaging between 86 and 92 per month. No significant changes in the suicide trends among women were observed. Conclusion These findings suggest that the initial effects of the Fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention were inadequate to curb the rising suicide trends, particularly among men. This study underscores the need for timely policy responses to reverse the current increasing trend in suicides, with particular focus on the male population.

Objectives: This study examined the shifts in the suicide trends in Korea during the initial phase of the Fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention, using interrupted time series analyses. Methods: Interrupted time series analyses were performed using the monthly suicide data from January 2011 to April 2024. Quasi-Poisson regression models were applied to evaluate the changes in the level and slope of the suicide trend before and after policy implementation. The Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Prophet models were used to compare the actual and predicted counterfactual numbers of suicides during the policy period. Results: The quasi-Poisson regression model revealed a significant change in the trend of suicides among men, with an increasing slope during the policy period. For total suicides, the ARIMA and Prophet models suggested that the actual number of suicides was significantly higher than the counterfactual number during the policy period, with excess suicides averaging between 113 and 150 per month. The actual number of suicides among men was significantly higher than the counterfactual number during the policy period, with excess suicides averaging between 86 and 92 per month. No significant changes in the suicide trends among women were observed. Conclusion These findings suggest that the initial effects of the Fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention were inadequate to curb the rising suicide trends, particularly among men. This study underscores the need for timely policy responses to reverse the current increasing trend in suicides, with particular focus on the male population.

Objectives: This study examined the shifts in the suicide trends in Korea during the initial phase of the Fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention, using interrupted time series analyses. Methods: Interrupted time series analyses were performed using the monthly suicide data from January 2011 to April 2024. Quasi-Poisson regression models were applied to evaluate the changes in the level and slope of the suicide trend before and after policy implementation. The Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Prophet models were used to compare the actual and predicted counterfactual numbers of suicides during the policy period. Results: The quasi-Poisson regression model revealed a significant change in the trend of suicides among men, with an increasing slope during the policy period. For total suicides, the ARIMA and Prophet models suggested that the actual number of suicides was significantly higher than the counterfactual number during the policy period, with excess suicides averaging between 113 and 150 per month. The actual number of suicides among men was significantly higher than the counterfactual number during the policy period, with excess suicides averaging between 86 and 92 per month. No significant changes in the suicide trends among women were observed. Conclusion These findings suggest that the initial effects of the Fifth Master Plan for Suicide Prevention were inadequate to curb the rising suicide trends, particularly among men. This study underscores the need for timely policy responses to reverse the current increasing trend in suicides, with particular focus on the male population.

Background: The number of general cosmetic practitioners impersonating dermatologists in Korea has increased, leading to serious harm that is significant enough to attract the attention of health authorities, which dermatologists are deeply concerned about. Objective: We conducted a survey targeting dermatologists to gather their opinions on the behavior, problems, and countermeasures of general cosmetic practitioners disguising themselves as dermatologists. Methods: A total of 280 dermatologists completed the survey between January and February 2024. The questions covered demographic characteristics, experiences of cosmetic general practitioners falsely introduced themselves as dermatologists, complications experienced by patients who received treatment after being mistaken for a dermatologist, the seriousness of the problem for cosmetic general practitioners impersonating dermatologists, and the relationship between the shortage of essential medical personnel and the phenomenon of cosmetic general practitioners disguising themselves as dermatologists. Results: Despite cases in which cosmetic general practitioners impersonate dermatologists, most dermatologists have not responded appropriately in many instances. Dermatologists have reported many cases of complications after receiving dermatological treatment from such cosmetic general practitioners. Most dermatologists are concerned about the serious problems of general cosmetic practitioners, disguising themselves as dermatologists and anticipating many adverse effects. Conclusion We believe that we need to pool our wisdom to solve these problems and expect that this study will provide valuable basic data for solving these problems in the dermatology and medical environments of Korea.