ObjectiveTo evaluate the clinical efficacy and safety of Huaban Jiedu Formulation （化斑解毒方， HJF） in treating psoriasis vulgaris with blood-heat syndrome. MethodsA randomized， double-blind， placebo-controlled study was conducted with 60 patients diagnosed with psoriasis vulgaris of blood-heat syndrome. Patients were randomly assigned to either a treatment group or a control group， with 30 cases in each. The treatment group received HJF granules orally， one dose a day， combined with topical Qingshi Zhiyang Ointment （青石止痒软膏）， while the control group received placebo granules， one dose a day， combined with the same topical ointment. Both groups were topically treated twice daily of 28 days treatment cours. Psoriasis area and severity index （PASI）， visual analogue scale for pruritus （VAS）， traditional Chinese medicine （TCM） syndrome scores， dermatology life quality index （DLQI）， and psoriasis life stress inventory （PLSI） were assessed before treatment and on day 14 and day 28. Response rates for PASI 50 （≥50% reduction） and PASI 75 （≥75% reduction）， as well as overall clinical efficacy， were compared between groups. Serum levels of interleukin-6 （IL-6） and interleukin-17 （IL-17） were measured before and after 28 days of treatment. Adverse reactions during treatment were recorded. ResultsAfter 28 days of treatment， both groups showed significant reductions in PASI total score， lesion area score， erythema， scaling， and infiltration scores， pruritus VAS score， TCM syndrome score， DLQI， PLSI， and serum IL-6 and IL-17 levels （P＜0.05）. Compared to the control group， the treatment group had significantly greater improvements in PASI total score and erythema score， TCM syndrome score， serum IL-6 and IL-17 levels， and PASI 50 response rate after 28 days （P＜0.05）. Between-group comparisons of score differences before and after 28-day treatment revealed that the treatment group showed significantly better improvements in PASI total， lesion area score， erythema score， TCM syndrome score， DLQI， PLSI， and inflammatory markers （P＜0.05 or P＜0.01）. The total effective rate on day 14 and day 28 was 40.00% （12/30） and 83.33% （25/30） in the treatment group， versus 6.90% （2/29） and 41.38% （12/29） in the control group， respectively. The clinical efficacy in the treatment group was significantly superior to that in the control group （P＜0.05）. Mild gastric discomfort occurred in 3 patients in the treatment group and 1 in the control group. ConclusionHJF can effectively improve skin lesions and TCM symptoms relieve pruritus， enhance quality of life， and reduce inflammatory markers IL-6 and IL-17， in patients with blood-heat syndrome of psoriasis vulgaris， with a good safety profile.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

Objective:To investigate respiratory virus infection in children with septic shock in pediatric care units (PICU) in China and its influence on clinical outcomes.Methods:The clinical data of children with septic shock in children′s PICU from January 2018 to December 2019 in 10 Chinese hospitals were retrospectively collected. They were divided into the pre-COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 groups according to the onset of disease, and the characteristics and composition of respiratory virus in the 2 groups were compared. Matching age, malignant underlying diseases, bacteria, fungi and other viruses, a new database was generated using 1∶1 propensity score matching method. The children were divided into the respiratory virus group and non-respiratory virus group according to the presence or absence of respiratory virus infection; their clinical characteristics, diagnosis, and treatment were compared by t-test, rank sum test and Chi-square test. The correlation between respiratory virus infection and the clinical outcomes was analyzed by logistic regression. Results:A total of 1 247 children with septic shock were included in the study, of them 748 were male; the age was 37 (11, 105) months. In the pre-and post-COVID-19 groups, there were 530 and 717 cases of septic shock, respectively; the positive rate of respiratory virus was 14.9% (79 cases) and 9.8% (70 cases); the seasonal distribution of septic shock was 28.9% (153/530) and 25.9% (185/717) in autumn, and 30.3% (161/530) and 28.3% (203/717) in winter, respectively, and the corresponding positive rates of respiratory viruses were 19.6% (30/153) and 15.7% (29/185) in autumn, and 21.1% (34/161) and 15.3% (31/203) in winter, respectively. The positive rates of influenza virus and adenovirus in the post-COVID-19 group were lower than those in the pre-COVID-19 group (2.1% (15/717) vs. 7.5% (40/530), and 0.7% (5/717) vs. 3.2% (17/530), χ2=21.51 and 11.08, respectively; all P<0.05). Rhinovirus virus were higher than those in the pre-Covid-19 group (1.7% (12/717) vs. 0.2% (1/530), χ2=6.51, P=0.011). After propensity score matching, there were 147 cases in both the respiratory virus group and the non-respiratory virus group. Rate of respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress, rate of disseminated coagulation dysfunction, and immunoglobulin usage of the respiratory virus group were higher than those of non-respiratory virus group (77.6% (114/147) vs. 59.2% (87/147), 17.7% (26/147) vs. 4.1% (6/147), 15.6% (25/147) vs. 4.1% (7/147), and 35.4% (52/147) vs. 21.4% (32/147); χ2=11.07, 14.02, 11.06 and 6.67, all P<0.05); and PICU hospitalization of the former was longer than that of the later (7 (3, 16) vs. 3 (1, 7)d, Z=5.01, P<0.001). Univariate logistic regression analysis showed that the presence of respiratory viral infection was associated with respiratory failure, disseminated coagulation dysfunction, the use of mechanical ventilation, and the use of immunoglobulin and anti-respiratory viral drugs ( OR=2.42, 0.22, 0.25, 0.56 and 1.12, all P<0.05). Conclusions:The composition of respiratory virus infection in children with septic shock is different between pre and post-COVID-19. Respiratory viral infection is associated with organ dysfunction in children with septic shock. Decreasing respiratory viral infection through respiratory protection may improve the clinical outcome of these children.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.

China's healthcare payment reform seeks to combine a medical insurance point-system with a global budget.The focus and difficulty in implementing the payment reform is how to make effectively link.On the basis of theoretical analysis,it selects the regions that have implemented the payment by disease under regional total budget and the payment by disease under institutional total budget,and summarizes the synergistic mechanism of total budget and payment by disease,including the strict control of total budget at the regional level,the reasonable setup of the budget or the standard of expected service volume at the institutional level,and the rate fluctuation and discount mechanism for the settlement of excess service;and further sort out the additional incentive mechanism to support innovation and quality enhancement under the background of the total budget and the payment by disease.Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of typical regions to strengthen the synergy between regional budgets,institutional budgets and payment by type of disease,and cautiously deal with the risks of excessive competition and"punching points"that may arise from the regional point method.