Objective:To analyze the grassroots diseases category policy of DIP,explore the influencing mechanism on patient flow,and provide references for other DIP reform pilot regions.Methods:It conducts game theory analysis on the service supply behaviors of different medical institutions under the grassroots diseases category policy,and reveals the reasons affecting the role of grassroots diseases category.Results:Research has found that grassroots diseases can weaken the siphonage of tertiary institutions,but the prerequisite is to establish reasonable disease payment standards;there is a competitive relationship among secondary medical institutions,and secondary medical institutions will still exacerbate grassroots siphonage;the supervision and assessment mechanism for grassroots diseases is not sound,making it difficult to avoid the unreasonable medical service behavior of medical institutions under grassroots diseases.Conclusion:It is needed to further optimize the formulation of payment standards for grassroots diseases in medical insurance departments,consider adding grassroots diseases to primary medical institutions and resolving competitive conflicts between primary and secondary medical institutions,improve the supervision and assessment mechanism for grassroots diseases to prevent unreasonable medical service behavior.

Objective:To analyze the grassroots diseases category policy of DIP,explore the influencing mechanism on patient flow,and provide references for other DIP reform pilot regions.Methods:It conducts game theory analysis on the service supply behaviors of different medical institutions under the grassroots diseases category policy,and reveals the reasons affecting the role of grassroots diseases category.Results:Research has found that grassroots diseases can weaken the siphonage of tertiary institutions,but the prerequisite is to establish reasonable disease payment standards;there is a competitive relationship among secondary medical institutions,and secondary medical institutions will still exacerbate grassroots siphonage;the supervision and assessment mechanism for grassroots diseases is not sound,making it difficult to avoid the unreasonable medical service behavior of medical institutions under grassroots diseases.Conclusion:It is needed to further optimize the formulation of payment standards for grassroots diseases in medical insurance departments,consider adding grassroots diseases to primary medical institutions and resolving competitive conflicts between primary and secondary medical institutions,improve the supervision and assessment mechanism for grassroots diseases to prevent unreasonable medical service behavior.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.

Objective:To explore the cost control effect and cost-shifting effect of Diagnosis-Intervention Packet(DIP)payment reform on inpatient coronary heart disease patients.Methods:Z City,a national pilot city for DIP,is taken as a case study.It utilizes inpatient claims data and the propensity scoring matching-difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of DIP payment reform on total medical expenses,Out-of-Pocket(OOP),the OOP proportion,self-paid Category B expenses,the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses,Category C expenses,and the proportion of Category C expenses for coronary heart disease inpatients.Results:After the DIP reform,the total medical expenses per inpatient coronary heart disease patient significantly decreased(β=-0.127,P＜0.01).Regarding cost-shifting,the OOP expenses(β=0.108,P＜0.05),the OOP proportion(β=0.055,P＜0.01),self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.239,P＜0.01),the proportion of self-paid Category B expenses(β=0.030,P＜0.01),and the proportion of Category C expenses significantly increased(β=0.026,P＜0.01),while there was no significant change in Category C expenses.Conclusion:The DIP reform significantly reduced the total medical expenses per inpatient case of coronary heart disease.At the same time,the reform shifted costs from within the scope of the insurance policy to outside the policy's coverage,with a stronger shift observed from Category B to Category C expenses.