Objective:To explore how government departments can mobilize the enthusiasm of family doctors and residents to fulfill their obligations,and under what circumstances the three parties in the game will reach a stable state of government"encouragement",family doctors"effort",and residents"signing contracts".Methods:It constructs a three party evolutionary game model using evolutionary game theory,and conducts numerical simulations on the model using Matlab2022a Software to analyze its strategy choices under different conditions.Results:The key factors affecting the choice of the three party strategy in the game include government regulatory costs,policy subsidies,health benefits and economic costs of residents signing contracts.Conclusion:There is an optimal subsidy range for government financial subsidies,and residents'strategic choices are influenced by health benefits and economic costs.Changes in government supervision costs affect the strategic choices of family doctors.Measures such as formulating reasonable policy subsidy schemes,controlling transaction costs,and improving supervision mechanisms can promote the transformation of game players towards"encouragement,effort,and signing".

Objective To review the characteristics of Rhizopus microsporus infection for better awareness of the disease.Methods One case of pneumonia caused by R.microsporus was reported in a 66-year-old male patient.Similar reports on infections caused by R.microsporus were retrieved in PubMed and CNKI databases since 2013.The characteristics of patients with R.microsporus infection were reviewed.Results This case involves a 66-year-old male patient presenting with a 10-day history of cough,sputum production,and hemoptysis.The patient had a previous history of diabetes mellitus.Pulmonary CT scan revealed an irregular soft tissue density mass in the right lower lobe and pneumonia.The clinical presentation and laboratory findings were consistent with pulmonary mucormycosis caused by R.microsporus.R.microsporus was isolated from bronchoalveolar lavage fluid culture.The patient was treated with intravenous liposomal amphotericin B followed by oral posaconazole for antifungal therapy,and achieved a favorable prognosis.A total of 24 cases(18 males,5 females,1 unknown)of R.microsporus infection were reviewed(including this one).The specific site of infection included pulmonary infection(n=10),ocular infection(n=1),skin tuberculosis(n=1),splenic abscess(n=1),oral mucositis(n=1),gouty arthritis(n=1),esophageal ulceration(n=1),abdominal infection(n=1),and others(n=7).The clinical symptoms varied with the organs involved.Majority of the patients(n=11)were cured by surgery combined with antimicrobial therapy.Overall,13 patients died.Conclusions Clinicians should be aware of the possibility of R.microsporus infection in case of pulmonary infection,especially those with diabetes mellitus.

Objective To review the characteristics of Rhizopus microsporus infection for better awareness of the disease.Methods One case of pneumonia caused by R.microsporus was reported in a 66-year-old male patient.Similar reports on infections caused by R.microsporus were retrieved in PubMed and CNKI databases since 2013.The characteristics of patients with R.microsporus infection were reviewed.Results This case involves a 66-year-old male patient presenting with a 10-day history of cough,sputum production,and hemoptysis.The patient had a previous history of diabetes mellitus.Pulmonary CT scan revealed an irregular soft tissue density mass in the right lower lobe and pneumonia.The clinical presentation and laboratory findings were consistent with pulmonary mucormycosis caused by R.microsporus.R.microsporus was isolated from bronchoalveolar lavage fluid culture.The patient was treated with intravenous liposomal amphotericin B followed by oral posaconazole for antifungal therapy,and achieved a favorable prognosis.A total of 24 cases(18 males,5 females,1 unknown)of R.microsporus infection were reviewed(including this one).The specific site of infection included pulmonary infection(n=10),ocular infection(n=1),skin tuberculosis(n=1),splenic abscess(n=1),oral mucositis(n=1),gouty arthritis(n=1),esophageal ulceration(n=1),abdominal infection(n=1),and others(n=7).The clinical symptoms varied with the organs involved.Majority of the patients(n=11)were cured by surgery combined with antimicrobial therapy.Overall,13 patients died.Conclusions Clinicians should be aware of the possibility of R.microsporus infection in case of pulmonary infection,especially those with diabetes mellitus.

Objective:To explore how government departments can mobilize the enthusiasm of family doctors and residents to fulfill their obligations,and under what circumstances the three parties in the game will reach a stable state of government"encouragement",family doctors"effort",and residents"signing contracts".Methods:It constructs a three party evolutionary game model using evolutionary game theory,and conducts numerical simulations on the model using Matlab2022a Software to analyze its strategy choices under different conditions.Results:The key factors affecting the choice of the three party strategy in the game include government regulatory costs,policy subsidies,health benefits and economic costs of residents signing contracts.Conclusion:There is an optimal subsidy range for government financial subsidies,and residents'strategic choices are influenced by health benefits and economic costs.Changes in government supervision costs affect the strategic choices of family doctors.Measures such as formulating reasonable policy subsidy schemes,controlling transaction costs,and improving supervision mechanisms can promote the transformation of game players towards"encouragement,effort,and signing".

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.