1.Incidence trend of infectious diseases among kindergarten children in Yangpu District, Shanghai in 2009 - 2023
Qiaoli SUN ; Xiao YANG ; Jiahui LIU ; Fangfang TAO
Journal of Public Health and Preventive Medicine 2026;37(1):48-52
Objective To investigate the incidence trend of infectious diseases among kindergarten children in Yangpu District, Shanghai, and to provide scientific reference for prevention and control strategies of infectious diseases among key populations. Methods Descriptive epidemiology method and Joinpoint regression analysis model were used to analyze the surveillance data of infectious diseases among kindergarten children. Results The average annual reported incidence of infectious diseases among kindergarten children in Yangpu District was 3,344.08/100,000, showing a downward trend (AAPC=-5.51, 95%CI: -13.02~2.63). Intestinal (65.49%) and respiratory (34.48%) infectious diseases were the main cases. There were 7,378 cases of hand, foot and mouth disease (62.95%), 1,885 cases of influenza (16.08%), 1,378 cases of varicella (11.76%), and 392 cases of mumps (3.34%), accounting for 94.14% of all reported cases. Hand, foot and mouth disease (AAPC=-17.68%, 95%CI: -27.52~-6.51), mumps (AAPC=-9.33, 95%CI: -14.86~-3.45) and varicella (AAPC=-7.32, 95%CI: -17.35~3.93) showed an overall decreasing trend, while influenza (AAPC=32.19, 95%CI: 12.49-55.34) was on the rise. The incidence of the disease showed double peak distribution, and the high incidence months were from May to July and from September to December. The male to female ratio was 1.39:1. Conclusion The incidence of infectious diseases among kindergarten children in Yangpu District shows a downward trend. It is necessary to continue to increase the coverage rate of Enterovirus 71(EV71), influenza, chickenpox and MMR combined live attenuated vaccine, strengthen monitoring and early warning, actively carry out health guidance, and effectively control the occurrence of common infectious diseases in kindergarten children.
2.Analysis of the pre-metabolic disease state based on the theory of "overflow of Wu Qi"
Qing HE ; Zirong LI ; Qiaoli YANG ; Jing LIN ; Guangqi WANG ; Jin QIN ; Shangjian LIU
International Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine 2024;46(3):278-282
The pre-metabolic disease state is the body state of substance metabolism disorder that has not yet reached the physical and chemical indicators of the disease, and abnormal glucose metabolism is often the key link of metabolic disorder. In TCM, the healthy function of the spleen is the cornerstone of the production and distribution of fine substances. This article discussed the pre-metabolic disease state based on the theory of "overflow of Five Qi" in the Nei Jing, taking the loss of spleen preparedness as the starting point, in order to provide new ideas and directions for the prevention and treatment of clinical metabolic diseases.
3.Distribution of traditional Chinese medicine constitution and related influential factors in 450 patients with impaired glucose tolerance
Zirong LI ; Qiaoli YANG ; Yu XIE ; Shangjian LIU
Journal of Beijing University of Traditional Chinese Medicine 2024;47(4):459-465
Objective We aimed to study the distribution of traditional Chinese medicine(TCM)constitution and related influencing factors in patients with impaired glucose tolerance(IGT).Methods A cross-sectional study method was used to enroll IGT patients who attended one of eight collaborating units across China between January and August 2021.Basic information was recorded,physical and laboratory examinations were completed,and the data on TCM constitution were collected according to the"classification and determination table of TCM constitution."Finally,patient information was entered into an Excel table,and the data were analyzed using SPSS 26.0.Results Among the 450 patients,a balanced constitution accounted for 37.3%,yang-deficiency constitution for 15.6%,phlegm-dampness constitution for 14.4%,and dampness-heat constitution for 10.9%.Among the biased constitutions,the proportion of men with dampness-heat constitution was higher than that of women,and the proportion of women with yang-deficiency constitution and blood stasis constitution was significantly higher than that of men(P<0.05).The triglyceride level of patients with phlegm-dampness constitution was higher than that of patients with yang-deficiency constitution(P<0.05);the HDL-cholestrol level of patients with yang-deficiency constitution was higher than that of patients with phlegm-dampness constitution(P<0.05);and the uric acid level of patients with phlegm-dampness constitution,dampness-heat constitution,or yin-deficiency constitution was higher than that of patients with yang-deficiency constitution,and the UA level was the highest in patients with dampness-heat constitution(P<0.05).Conclusion The distribution of TCM constitution in IGT patients was dominated by balanced constitution,followed by yang-deficiency constitution,phlegm-dampness constitution,and dampness-heat constitution.Gender,blood lipid levels,and UA levels were the main factors affecting the constitution status of IGT patients.
4.Analysis on Dual-Task Incentives Contract for the Physicians in Public Hospitals/
Qiaoli WANG ; Lihong YANG ; Jun YU
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):73-75,80
Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.
5.Research on the Incentive Mechanism for Doctors in Public Hospitals Based on the Perspective of Equity Preference
Jun YU ; Lihong YANG ; Qiaoli WANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):76-80
Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.
6.Analysis on Dual-Task Incentives Contract for the Physicians in Public Hospitals/
Qiaoli WANG ; Lihong YANG ; Jun YU
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):73-75,80
Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.
7.Research on the Incentive Mechanism for Doctors in Public Hospitals Based on the Perspective of Equity Preference
Jun YU ; Lihong YANG ; Qiaoli WANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):76-80
Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.
8.Analysis on Dual-Task Incentives Contract for the Physicians in Public Hospitals/
Qiaoli WANG ; Lihong YANG ; Jun YU
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):73-75,80
Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.
9.Research on the Incentive Mechanism for Doctors in Public Hospitals Based on the Perspective of Equity Preference
Jun YU ; Lihong YANG ; Qiaoli WANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):76-80
Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.
10.Analysis on Dual-Task Incentives Contract for the Physicians in Public Hospitals/
Qiaoli WANG ; Lihong YANG ; Jun YU
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(10):73-75,80
Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.


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