Objective To investigate the impact of various health education intervention strategies on the proper use of personal respiratory protective equipment (RPE) among workers exposed to dust. Methods Dust-exposed workers were recruited from 60 selected enterprises in Guangdong Province using cluster random sampling method. They were randomly allocated to the control, low-intensity intervention, and high-intensity intervention groups, with 358, 346, and 371 workers in each group, respectively. Workers in the control group received no designed intervention. Workers in the low-intensity intervention group received traditional plus mobile health education on the proper use of RPE. Workers in the high-intensity intervention group received all components of the low-intensity intervention, supplemented with peer education. The intervention lasted for six months. RPE usage was compared among the three groups of workers before and after the intervention. Results Workers in the control, low-intensity intervention, and high-intensity intervention groups showed higher rates of both RPE wearing and correct RPE wearing after the intervention than before it within their respective groups (RPE wearing rate: 94.1% vs 99.2%, 95.7% vs 100.0%, 94.6% vs 100.0%, all P<0.01; correct RPE wearing rate: 66.8% vs 91.1%, 67.3% vs 95.7%, 66.6% vs 96.5%, all P<0.01). Post-intervention correct RPE wearing rates were highest in the high-intensity intervention group, followed by the low-intensity intervention group, and the control group, with the percentage of 96.50%, 95.66% and 91.06%, respectively (P<0.01). Binary logistic regression analysis result showed that different intervention strategies affected the correct use of personal RPE among dust-exposed workers after adjusting for gender, age, and other confounding factors (P<0.05). Compared with the control group, the rates of correct RPE use increased in the low-intensity intervention group and the high-intensity intervention group (odd ratio was 2.14 and 3.01; 95% confidence interval was 1.12 - 4.10 and 1.53 - 5.91, respectively). Conclusion The implementation of traditional plus mobile health education interventions on the proper use of RPE can promote correct RPE utilization among dust-exposed workers, and integrating peer education further enhances the intervention effectiveness.

The pre-metabolic disease state is the body state of substance metabolism disorder that has not yet reached the physical and chemical indicators of the disease, and abnormal glucose metabolism is often the key link of metabolic disorder. In TCM, the healthy function of the spleen is the cornerstone of the production and distribution of fine substances. This article discussed the pre-metabolic disease state based on the theory of "overflow of Five Qi" in the Nei Jing, taking the loss of spleen preparedness as the starting point, in order to provide new ideas and directions for the prevention and treatment of clinical metabolic diseases.

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.

Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.

Objective:To study the influencing factors of the effort level and incentive coefficient of doctors in public hospitals under different fairness preferences,and provide suggestions for the design of the incentive mechanism for doctors in public hospi-tals.Methods:The equity preference theory,principal-agent theory and Matlab Software were used for analysis.Results:The doc-tor's effort level was negatively correlated with the cost coefficient,positively correlated with the fairness preference level,and the promotion effect of vertical fairness preference on the effort level was higher than that of horizontal fairness preference;the incentive coefficient was positively correlated with the doctor's vertical fairness preference and negatively correlated with the horizontal equity preference.Conclusion:The government and hospital managers should reduce the effort cost of doctors,fully understand the fair-ness preference of doctors,strengthen the supervision of doctors'work,adopt a comprehensive incentive strategy to intervene in the fairness preference of doctors,and transform the negative utility of doctors'equity preference into the enthusiasm for working hard.