Objective To compare the value of the 2018 Chinese guideline prognostic score with that of the 2019 European Society of Cardiology(ESC)in the predicting efficiency for acute pulmonary embolism(APE)in 30-day all-cause mortality.Methods The data of the hospitalized patients with confirmed APE from January 2015 to December 2019 were retrospectively collected.According to death within 30 days,the patients were divided into a death group and a survival group.Subgroup analysis was performed according to gender,oxygen saturation and infection.The SPSS software was used to establish the receiver operating characteristic curve(ROC)for the two scores and calculated the area under the curve(AUC).The Delong's test was applied to compare the AUC differences.The net reclassification index(NRI)and integrated discrimination improvement(IDI)were calculated using the R software packages of survival,survIDINRI,and PredictABEL.Results 626 APE patients were enrolled,and 30-day death was predicted in those patients using two scores.In terms of overall discrimination,the 2018 Chinese guideline prognostic score was better than the 2019 ESC guideline prognostic score,with an AUC of 0.782 and 0.749,respectively;but there were no statistical differences between the two AUC(P＞0.05).In terms of prediction accuracy,the NRI of the 2019 ESC guideline prognostic score was 44.4%(95%CI:0.091～0.753),higher than that of the 2018 Chinese guidelines prognostic score,which increased by 58.6%(95%CI:0.161～0.917)in the correct reclassification to death group,while decreased by 14.2%(95%CI:-0.249～0.08)in the correct reclassification to survival group.IDI increased by 3.38%(P＜0.05).Subgroup analysis showed the prognostic scores of the 2018 Chinese guidelines and the 2019 ESC guidelines prognostic scores had predictive ability for patients with different gender and different oxygen saturation(P＜0.05),and the prognostic scores for co-infected population(AUC:0.749,0.772)(P＞0.05),non-coinfected population(AUC:0.652,0.833).Conclusions Both the 2018 Chinese guideline prognostic score and the 2019 ESC guideline prognostic score can predict 30-day mortality in APE patients,and have a better predictive ability for the co-infected population.However,the predictive accuracy of the former is higher than that of the latter in the survival group,and the score is more rapid and convenient for clinical application,while the latter has improved the prediction ability in the death group.

Objective: To investigate the screen exposure status and influencing factors among 6-12 year-old children in Hainan Province, so as to provide insights into screen exposure intervention for children. Methods: Children aged 6-12 years from 18 counties (cities) in Hainan Province were selected using multi-stage stratified cluster sampling method from December 2020 to July 2021. Demographic information, parents' educational level, family type and screen time was collected using questionnaire surveys. The screen exposure rate of children was analyzed, and factors affecting screen exposure were identified using a multivariable logistic regression model. Results: A total of 27 501 children were surveyed, including 13 901 boys (50.55%) and 13 600 girls (49.45%). The mean age was (9.22±1.86) years. Among them, 3 925 children had screen exposure, with a screen exposure rate of 14.27%. Multivariable logistic regression analysis showed that gender (female, OR=0.859, 95%CI: 0.796-0.926), age (OR=1.078, 95%CI: 1.049-1.108), ethnicity (ethnic minorities, OR=1.147, 95%CI: 1.041-1.254), place of residence (rural area, OR=0.869, 95%CI: 0.801-0.944), father's educational level (high school or technical secondary school, OR=0.879, 95%CI: 0.788-0.981; college degree or above, OR=0.686, 95%CI: 0.589-0.818), mother's educational level (college degree or above, OR=0.706, 95%CI: 0.588-0.846), family type (others, OR=1.250, 95%CI: 1.105-1.414), and annual family income (>100 000 Yuan, OR=0.741, 95%CI: 0.619-0.885) were the influencing factors for screen exposure among children aged 6-12 years. Conclusion The screen exposure among children aged 6-12 years in Hainan Province was affected by gender, age, ethnicity, place of residence, parental education level, family type and annual family income.

Objective:To analyze the incidence, epidemiology, and clinical characteristics of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in Guizhou Province from 2017 to 2021 and provide a scientific basis for monitoring of CJD in Guizhou Province.Methods:In this retrospective study, epidemiological and clinical information on suspected CJD cases reported by nine hospitals in Guizhou Province was collected and analyzed based on the laboratory test results of cerebrospinal fluid, blood, and skin samples from the patients.Results:From 2017 to 2021, a total of 47 patients with suspected CJD were reported in Guizhou Province, including 22 confirmed patients. Of these patients, 18 patients (18/22) were clinically diagnosed with sporadic CJD, 2 patients (2/22) were clinically suspected of having sCJD, and 2 patients (2/22) were confirmed to have genetic CJD. All patients primarily presented with rapid progressive dementia, and abnormal magnetic resonance imaging findings of the head are the main auxiliary examination results (16/20). The positive rate of 14-3-3 protein in cerebrospinal fluid was high (14/21). The blood sample PRNP gene testing revealed that 129 amino acids were M/M homozygous, while 219 amino acids were E/E homozygous. Except for T188K and E200K mutations detected by PRNP gene testing in 2 gCJD cases, no other site mutations were found, and 5 cases were positive for skin PrPSc. Patients' geographical distribution showed no obvious clustering. Patients have a wide range of occupations. The male-to-female ratio was 13:9, with a median age of 64 years. The majority of the patients were Han Chinese, and there was no special epidemiological history. Conclusion:The majority of the confirmed CJD patients in Guizhou Province from 2017 to 2021 are sporadic CJD patients, and their residence, occupation, gender ratio, age distribution, and other characteristics are consistent with the incidence patterns of sporadic CJD.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.