Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Public Hospital Salary System Reform Based on the Principal-agent Theory
- VernacularTitle:基于委托代理理论的公立医院薪酬制度改革激励机制研究
- Author:
Xuezhen LIU
1
;
Dian ZHOU
;
Wanying ZHAO
Author Information
1. 安徽医科大学卫生管理学院 安徽 合肥 230032
- Publication Type:Journal Article
- Keywords:
principal-agent theory;
public hospital;
salary system reform
- From:
Chinese Hospital Management
2025;45(6):16-20
- CountryChina
- Language:Chinese
-
Abstract:
Objective To explore and analyze the incentive changes before and after the implementation of the annual salary system in public hospitals to provide guidance for the implementation.Methods Using the principal-agent theory,construct the structure and model of government,hospitals and doctors,and analyze the salary incentive before and after the implementation of the annual salary system.Results Former doctors"seek profit"and hospital"income orientation"conflict with the government public welfare goals;after implementation,doctors transfer"public welfare"and hospital and government goals seek"public welfare coordination",but there are also new problems such as insufficient incentives.Conclusion If public hospitals successfully implement the annual salary system,they should adopt fine parameter design,supporting system and dynamic equilibrium mechanism.
