Three-party game and simulation analysis of health-related information quality regu-lation in public health emergencies
10.19723/j.issn.1671-167X.2025.03.015
- VernacularTitle:突发公共卫生事件健康相关信息质量监管的三方博弈及仿真分析
- Author:
Yu WANG
1
;
Rui YUAN
;
Shupeng LI
;
Chun CHANG
Author Information
1. 北京大学公共卫生学院社会医学与健康教育系,北京 100191
- Publication Type:Journal Article
- Keywords:
Health-related information;
Quality supervision;
Three-party evolution game
- From:
Journal of Peking University(Health Sciences)
2025;57(3):514-521
- CountryChina
- Language:Chinese
-
Abstract:
Objective:To construct a tripartite game model involving the government,the public,and the pharmaceutical industry alliance during public health emergencies,revealing the dynamic mechanisms of health-related information quality regulation and exploring effective strategies to optimize the informa-tion dissemination environment through reward-punishment mechanisms.Methods:Based on evolutionary game theory,a tripartite evolutionary game model was established,integrating strategy spaces,payoff functions,and parameter definitions for each stakeholder.The pharmaceutical industry alliance's strate-gies included publishing high-or low-quality information(α),the public's strategies encompassed ration-al analysis or passive response(β),and the government's strategies involved regulatory enforcement or inaction(γ).Key parameters,such as economic benefits(Iyy),regulatory costs(Czf),penalties(Fyy),and incentives(Pyy),were quantified to reflect real-world scenarios.Replicator dynamic equa-tions and Jacobian matrices were derived to analyze the stability of equilibrium points,while MATLAB 2016a simulations were conducted to validate the model under varying initial conditions(e.g.,Iyy=100,150,200;Pyy=0,20,35;Fyy=0,10,20).Sensitivity analyses examined the impact of critical pa-rameters on system evolution,by 50 iterative simulations to observe convergence patterns.Results:The study revealed three key findings:(1)Public rational discernment(β)significantly influenced the phar-maceutical industry's strategy.Simulations demonstrated that increasing Iqz(benefits of information acqui-sition)reduced Cqz(cognitive costs),elevating β from 0.4 to 0.8 and driving α(high-quality information probability)to stabilize at 1.(2)Government regulatory intensity(γ)correlated positively with the so-cial hazards of low-quality information.When Fyy+Pyy＞Iyy,speculative behaviors decreased,achieving equilibrium at α=1.(3)Dual stable equilibria emerged:a high-quality equilibrium(α=1,β=1,γ=0)with lower regulatory costs and a low-quality equilibrium(α=0,β=0,γ=1)associated with higher social risks.Phase diagrams illustrated path dependency,where initial α＜0.5 led to the low-quality equilibrium unless dynamic penalties(Fyy＞20)and incentives(Pyy＞30)were enforced.Conclusion:A"carrot-stick"collaborative governance framework is proposed,emphasizing categorized regulation,AI-enabled auditing,and dynamic penalty systems.Future research should integrate emotional utility func-tions to address irrational decision-making impacts,thereby enhancing the adaptability of health informa-tion regulatory systems.
