Objective:To analyze the impact of global budget on the medical flow treatment and fund allocation in a non-compact medical community based on the symbiosis theory, so as to provide references for relevant authorities to formulate policies for the medical community.Methods:Data on outpatient and emergency visits, discharges, and medical insurance fund usage of the leading hospital and primary medical and health institutions in a non-compact medical community were collected from the health information system of a certain city. The time range of the data spanned from January 2017 to December 2019. The total budget was implemented in April 2018. The symbiotic system of the non-compact medical community was analyzed based on the theory of symbiosis. Descriptive analysis and intermittent time series segmented regression model were used to analyze the changes in indexes related to the flow of medical treatment and fund allocation between the leading hospital and primary institutions under the global budget.Results:The non-compact medical community′s symbiotic system had developed a continuous symbiotic model in organization and an asymmetric reciprocal symbiotic model in behavior. From the perspective of medical treatment flow, the number of outpatient and emergency visits of leading hospital and primary institutions in the medical community showed an upward trend, with little change in the number of discharged patients from 2017 to 2019; The number of patients transferred by the leading hospital increased from 32 in 2017 to 87 in 2019. According to the analysis of the intermittent time series segmented regression model, after the implementation of global budget, the proportion of outpatient and emergency visits in leading hospital was decreased ( β3=-0.43, P<0.05), the proportion of outpatient and emergency visits in primary institutions was on the rise ( β3= 0.02, P<0.05). In terms of fund allocation, the share of health insurance fund of the leading hospital increased from 45.98% in 2017 to 46.51% in 2019, and the primary medical and health institutions decreased from 23.44% to 18.06%, as well as the ratio of per capita income of primary medical and health institutions to that of leading hospitals was decreased from 72.62% to 60.79%. Conclusions:Under the global budget, the outpatient and emergency medical treatment flow in a non-compact medical community had been optimized. However, there was an uneven distribution of funds among medical institutions at all levels. Thus it was recommended to continue to give full play to the positive incentive effect of the global budget, establish a scientific mechanism for distributing benefits, and strengthen supervision and management.

Objective:To understand the incentive effect and influencing factors of the current economic incentive policy for medical alliances in Longhua District of Shenzhen(the alliance for short) on doctors′ willingness to work at primary medical institutions(the primary for short) from the perspective of mental account, and to explore the economic incentive effect of different economic incentive distribution methods on doctors′ willingness to work at the primary.Methods:The questionnaire was designed based on mental account theory. Random sampling was made in November 2019 for a questionnaire survey among doctors in two district-level medical institutions of the alliance in Longhua District of Shenzhen. The purpose was to analyze their inclination to work at the primary and their selection preferences for economic incentive distribution methods under the current economic incentive policy. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, and the influencing factors of doctors′ willingness to work at the primary were analyzed by χ2 test and binary logistic regression. Results:A total of 254 valid questionnaires were collected with an effective recovery rate of 90.7%. Among the respondents, 189(74.4%) were willing to work at the primary, 168(66.1%) chose to receive the economic incentives specifically for working at the primary, and 148 people(58.3%) hoped to receive such economic incentives immediately. Education background, self-rated economic income level of doctors and different payment methods of economic incentive for working at the primary had significant effects on their willingness to work at the primary( P<0.05). Conclusions:The current economic incentive policy of the alliance can meet the demands for economic incentives in terms of doctors′ material accounts, and doctors′ overall inclination to work at the primary was strong. If the amount of economic incentives is constant, doctors preferred to receive the economic incentives specifically, mainly affected by income accounts and additional income accounts. In addition, education and self-assessment of economic income level were important factors affecting the willingness of doctors to work at the primary, which may be affected by mental accounts other than material accounts.