Objective To analyze the relationship between the urine iodine level in different pregnant periods of women and the thyroid function .Methods The pregnant women were randomly sampled in Foshan city and 490 cases were selected as the research subjects ,including 170 cases of early stage pregnancy ,162 cases of middle stage pregnancy and 158 cases of late stage pregnancy . According to the thyroid function ,490 subjects were divided into the normal thyroid function group and the abnormal thyroid func‐tion group .Results 140 cases(88 .61% ) in the late stage pregnancy had normal thyroid function ,which were less than 166 cases (97 .65% ) in the early stage pregnancy and 157 cases (96 .91% ) in the middle stage pregnancy ;the constituent ratio of urine iodine < 100 μg/L in the early stage pregnancy was 19 .88% (33/166) in the normal thyroid function ,which was lower than 75 .00%(3/5) in the abnormal thyroid function group .The constituent ratio of urine iodine 100 - 300 μg/L in the early stage pregnancy group was 56 .0% (93/166) ,which was higher than 0 .0% (0/4) in the of abnormal thyroid function group .Conclusion It is neces‐sary to conduct the urinary iodine monitoring in early pregnant woman ,moreover it is suggested that the thyroid function detection will be conducted in the pregnant women with urine iodine < 100 μg/L and urine iodine 100 - 300 μg/L .

Objective To investigate the influencing factors for knowledge,attitude and practice(KAP)of the Three-manager mode about hierarchical medical system of Chronic diseases of the community residents in Xiamen,and provide references for the implementation of hierarchical medical system.Methods Multi-stage random sampling method was adopted,and 400 residents were randomly sampled from 5 communities of Xiamen for questionnaire survey.The survey features the dependent variable of the community residents′ knowing and joining-in the Three-manager mode,the internal factors(social demographic characteristics),and the external factors(medical expenditure and healthcare insurance).On such basis,four logistic regression models were built for analysis of such influencing factors.Results 41.10% of the surveyed were aware of the Three-manager mode,and 39.71% of the hypertension/diabetes patients among them joined in the hypertension network or diabetes network.Age,education,medical expenditure and referral experiences were significant influencing factors for KAP level of the Three-manager mode,while the residents of older age,higher education and referral experiences were high in their KAP;those of lower per capita monthly income,hypertension or diabetes,with coverage of medical insurance and satisfied with medical consultation in community were high in their awareness of Three-manager mode.Conclusions The KAP level of Three-manager mode of the community residents in Xiamen is acceptable,yet expected of further improvement.Room of further improvement includes enhancement of synergy of the Three-manager mode,enhanced motivation of government financial support and medical insurance,better service functions of community institutions,and especially the construction of hierarchical medical system.

Objective To estimate the status of understanding hierarchical medical mode in chronic disease management among medical staff and residents in Xiamen .Methods The multi-stage sampling was used in the study to select 49 physicians from the tertiary hospitals , 58 general practitioners ( GPs ) and health managers from 5 community health services centers , and 499 residents from 5 communities in Xiamen.We conducted a face-to-face survey to estimate their basic information , recognition for hierarchical medical mode , and patients'willingness for community first contact care .The data was described by mean value of frequency and constituent ratio , the chi-square test or Fisher's exact test was used for comparison among groups .Logistic regression was performed to analyze the factors influencing the residents 'preference for treatment in community medical institutions . Results The physicians from tertiary hospitals or community health service centers were almost all familiar with Xiamen mode (91/107, 85%), and more than half of them knew about the hierarchical medical system (67/107, 62.6%), 86.9% (93/107) of them knew about the guide of hierarchical medical system , 58.9%(63/107) of them received the relative training before .The physicians from community had higher knowledge , more frequency training , more referral experiences and more effective evaluation than the physicians from hospitals (all P<0.05).In our study, 86.2%(344/399) of residents were willing to see doctors in community health centers and 77.9%(311/399) of them were willing to return to community health service centers from tertiary hospitals for disease convalescence or chronic disease management;53.6% (214/399) of residents preferred to utilize community first contact care when they got chronic diseases , and they were more satisfied with the consultation and diagnosis process in community .The residents who knew about the hierarchical medical system were more likely to utilize community first contact care and return to community for medical care . However, the female or the higher-income residents were less likely to see doctors in community .Patients who had experienced transfer to community or had higher satisfaction to community care were more willing to return from hospitals to community for disease convalescence .The mode showed that the system was more effective in measuring and controlling blood pressure or blood glucose for patients who joined the patients 'network than for those did not join.(P<0.05).Conclusion Medical staff are familiar with hierarchical medical system , and the residents are likely to use community health service as their first contact care in Xiamen.The utilization of community first contact care is influenced by sex , family income, previous experience, knowledge of the system , and satisfaction to the system of patients .

Objective To clarify the interaction among the interests and strategic choices of multiple subjects of medical insurance for the older people in China,and to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of medical insurance policy for the older people.Methods An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and its steady state was simulated using Matlab R2021b software for the health insurer,the health care provider and the elderly.Results There is a conflict of interest between health insurance providers,healthcare providers and older people when all three parties consider maximising their own utility.In order to reach an evolutionary equilibrium,the strategic choice of the health insurance provider is to take"cost-cutting"behaviour to control the expenditure of the health insurance fund;the strategic choice of the older people is to increase the use of medical services to meet the demand for medical services;and the strategic choice of the medical service provider is related to the quantitative relationship between the reimbursement ratio of the health insurance and the cost ratio of medical services.When the reimbursement rate is 0.95,the probability that the provider will choose rational behaviour to control health care expenditure is the highest.Conclusion Healthcare providers with higher reimbursement rates have a higher probability of choosing rational behaviour.At the same time,the medical insurance reimbursement ratio cannot be raised blindly.It is recommended that the level of health insurance benefits be reasonably adjusted,the construction of a differentiation of the reimbursement ratio of medical insurance should be improved,and the measures for the management of medical behaviors should be enhanced,so as to effectively meet the health needs of the elderly population while at the same time guaranteeing medical safety.

Objective:To analyze the basic medical insurance fund balance status in China and the risk warning since the new medical reform,in order to provide decision-making references for the sustainable development of basic medical insurance fund in China.Methods:Collecting the data on the basic medical insurance fund in China from 2009 to 2022 for descriptive statistical analysis,and conduct fund balance risk warning analysis based on the risk warning interval.Results:During 2009-2021,the percentage of retirees enrolled in UEBMI has continued to increase,and there will still be a certain accumulated balance in the integrated fund.The number of participants in the URBMI has been decreased since 2020,the growth rate of fund expenditures became higher than the growth rate of fund revenues,the fund balance showed a decreasing trend.Conclusion:There are certain risks to the long-term balance of the basic medical insurance fund,which may caused by factors such as aging population,funding mechanisms,and treatment levels.

Objective To clarify the interaction among the interests and strategic choices of multiple subjects of medical insurance for the older people in China,and to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of medical insurance policy for the older people.Methods An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and its steady state was simulated using Matlab R2021b software for the health insurer,the health care provider and the elderly.Results There is a conflict of interest between health insurance providers,healthcare providers and older people when all three parties consider maximising their own utility.In order to reach an evolutionary equilibrium,the strategic choice of the health insurance provider is to take"cost-cutting"behaviour to control the expenditure of the health insurance fund;the strategic choice of the older people is to increase the use of medical services to meet the demand for medical services;and the strategic choice of the medical service provider is related to the quantitative relationship between the reimbursement ratio of the health insurance and the cost ratio of medical services.When the reimbursement rate is 0.95,the probability that the provider will choose rational behaviour to control health care expenditure is the highest.Conclusion Healthcare providers with higher reimbursement rates have a higher probability of choosing rational behaviour.At the same time,the medical insurance reimbursement ratio cannot be raised blindly.It is recommended that the level of health insurance benefits be reasonably adjusted,the construction of a differentiation of the reimbursement ratio of medical insurance should be improved,and the measures for the management of medical behaviors should be enhanced,so as to effectively meet the health needs of the elderly population while at the same time guaranteeing medical safety.

Objective To clarify the interaction among the interests and strategic choices of multiple subjects of medical insurance for the older people in China,and to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of medical insurance policy for the older people.Methods An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and its steady state was simulated using Matlab R2021b software for the health insurer,the health care provider and the elderly.Results There is a conflict of interest between health insurance providers,healthcare providers and older people when all three parties consider maximising their own utility.In order to reach an evolutionary equilibrium,the strategic choice of the health insurance provider is to take"cost-cutting"behaviour to control the expenditure of the health insurance fund;the strategic choice of the older people is to increase the use of medical services to meet the demand for medical services;and the strategic choice of the medical service provider is related to the quantitative relationship between the reimbursement ratio of the health insurance and the cost ratio of medical services.When the reimbursement rate is 0.95,the probability that the provider will choose rational behaviour to control health care expenditure is the highest.Conclusion Healthcare providers with higher reimbursement rates have a higher probability of choosing rational behaviour.At the same time,the medical insurance reimbursement ratio cannot be raised blindly.It is recommended that the level of health insurance benefits be reasonably adjusted,the construction of a differentiation of the reimbursement ratio of medical insurance should be improved,and the measures for the management of medical behaviors should be enhanced,so as to effectively meet the health needs of the elderly population while at the same time guaranteeing medical safety.

Objective To clarify the interaction among the interests and strategic choices of multiple subjects of medical insurance for the older people in China,and to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of medical insurance policy for the older people.Methods An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and its steady state was simulated using Matlab R2021b software for the health insurer,the health care provider and the elderly.Results There is a conflict of interest between health insurance providers,healthcare providers and older people when all three parties consider maximising their own utility.In order to reach an evolutionary equilibrium,the strategic choice of the health insurance provider is to take"cost-cutting"behaviour to control the expenditure of the health insurance fund;the strategic choice of the older people is to increase the use of medical services to meet the demand for medical services;and the strategic choice of the medical service provider is related to the quantitative relationship between the reimbursement ratio of the health insurance and the cost ratio of medical services.When the reimbursement rate is 0.95,the probability that the provider will choose rational behaviour to control health care expenditure is the highest.Conclusion Healthcare providers with higher reimbursement rates have a higher probability of choosing rational behaviour.At the same time,the medical insurance reimbursement ratio cannot be raised blindly.It is recommended that the level of health insurance benefits be reasonably adjusted,the construction of a differentiation of the reimbursement ratio of medical insurance should be improved,and the measures for the management of medical behaviors should be enhanced,so as to effectively meet the health needs of the elderly population while at the same time guaranteeing medical safety.

Objective To clarify the interaction among the interests and strategic choices of multiple subjects of medical insurance for the older people in China,and to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of medical insurance policy for the older people.Methods An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and its steady state was simulated using Matlab R2021b software for the health insurer,the health care provider and the elderly.Results There is a conflict of interest between health insurance providers,healthcare providers and older people when all three parties consider maximising their own utility.In order to reach an evolutionary equilibrium,the strategic choice of the health insurance provider is to take"cost-cutting"behaviour to control the expenditure of the health insurance fund;the strategic choice of the older people is to increase the use of medical services to meet the demand for medical services;and the strategic choice of the medical service provider is related to the quantitative relationship between the reimbursement ratio of the health insurance and the cost ratio of medical services.When the reimbursement rate is 0.95,the probability that the provider will choose rational behaviour to control health care expenditure is the highest.Conclusion Healthcare providers with higher reimbursement rates have a higher probability of choosing rational behaviour.At the same time,the medical insurance reimbursement ratio cannot be raised blindly.It is recommended that the level of health insurance benefits be reasonably adjusted,the construction of a differentiation of the reimbursement ratio of medical insurance should be improved,and the measures for the management of medical behaviors should be enhanced,so as to effectively meet the health needs of the elderly population while at the same time guaranteeing medical safety.

Objective To clarify the interaction among the interests and strategic choices of multiple subjects of medical insurance for the older people in China,and to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of medical insurance policy for the older people.Methods An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and its steady state was simulated using Matlab R2021b software for the health insurer,the health care provider and the elderly.Results There is a conflict of interest between health insurance providers,healthcare providers and older people when all three parties consider maximising their own utility.In order to reach an evolutionary equilibrium,the strategic choice of the health insurance provider is to take"cost-cutting"behaviour to control the expenditure of the health insurance fund;the strategic choice of the older people is to increase the use of medical services to meet the demand for medical services;and the strategic choice of the medical service provider is related to the quantitative relationship between the reimbursement ratio of the health insurance and the cost ratio of medical services.When the reimbursement rate is 0.95,the probability that the provider will choose rational behaviour to control health care expenditure is the highest.Conclusion Healthcare providers with higher reimbursement rates have a higher probability of choosing rational behaviour.At the same time,the medical insurance reimbursement ratio cannot be raised blindly.It is recommended that the level of health insurance benefits be reasonably adjusted,the construction of a differentiation of the reimbursement ratio of medical insurance should be improved,and the measures for the management of medical behaviors should be enhanced,so as to effectively meet the health needs of the elderly population while at the same time guaranteeing medical safety.