This study is to analyze the change of the health insurance policy in the 1970s in relation to social welfare discourse. The public health care in Korea was in very poor condition around the first amendment of the National Health Insurance Act in 1970. Furthermore, due to the introduction of new medical technology, increasing number of big hospitals participating in the medical market, inflation, and other factors, medical expenses skyrocketed and made it hard for ordinary people to enjoy medical services. Accordingly, the social solution to the problem of medical expenses which an individual found hard to deal with became of demand. And as the way to the solution, it was inevitable to consider the introduction of health insurance as social insurance. In this condition, Park regime began to stress the social development from the 1960s. It was to aim to settle various social problems triggered by the rapid industrialization in the 1960s through social development as well as economic development. As the social development was emphasized, the matter of social welfare appeared of importance and led to the first amendment of the National Health Insurance Act in 1970. However, it was impossible for Korean government to enforce a nationwide health insurance. The key issue was how to fund it. Park regime was reluctant to use government fund; it was also hard to burden private companies. Even while the health insurance policy was not determined yet for this reason, the social demand for health insurance became large and large. In particular, in the midst of the first "Oil Shock" which gave a big blow to people's living condition from the late 1973, some reported issues in relation to health service, such as hospitals' rejection of the poor, became a big problem. Coupled with the social demand for a health insurance system, the changes occurred within the medical community was also important. Most of all, hospitals was facing the decrease of the effectiveness of their medical facilities. Therefore, they began to see health insurance as a means of developing potential demand for medical service. In addition, the business world, which already expanded their own corporate welfare for employees from the early 1970s, sharing the idea that it was impossible to keep the issue of public health insurance unsolved, showed an enthusiastic attitude. These factors finally enabled Park regime to adopt the public health insurance system. Likewise, it is critical to understand the establishment of the public health insurance system in Korea through pursuing the process to it. What matters is the discoursive changes as well as the changes in social condition around the establishment, not merely the policy changes per se. Then most people, including decision makers in Park regime, thought of social welfare as a privilege developed countries. Thus, in the 1970s when unbalanced industrialization brought about widening gap between social classes, the employment of a social welfare policy could be recognized as a symbol of an escape from backwardness. In fact, with the introduction of the national health insurance in the 1970s, Park regime could fortify the material fundamental of a social welfare discourse which would be mobilized to strengthen the dichotomous discourse of developedness and backwardness and to dump the social crisis caused by Park regime's industrialization drive on the next generation.
Health Policy/economics/*history ; History, 20th Century ; Humans ; National Health Programs/*history ; Public Health/economics/history ; Social Welfare/economics/*history

This paper aimed to examine the debate over the fertility decline in the German Empire, focusing on the role of the SPD. During the German Empire, the fertility rate dramatically declined and the growing awareness of a continuous decline in the birth rate prompted a massive debate among politicians, doctors, sociologists, and feminist activists. The fertility decline was negatively evaluated and generated consciousness of crisis. However, it was not the only way to face this new phenomenon. Indeed, the use of birth control among the upper class was interpreted as a part of a modernizing process. As the same phenomenon reached the working class, it suddenly became a social problem and was attributed to the SPD. The debate over the fertility decline in imperial German society ridden with a fierce class conflict was developed into a weapon against the SPD. Contrary to the assumption of conservative politicians, the SPD had no clear-cut position on this issue. Except for a few politicians like Kautsky and the doctors who came into frequent contact with the workers, the "birth strike" was not listed as the main interest of the SPD. Even Clara Zetkin, the leader of the Social Democratic women's organization viewed it as a concern of the individual person which could not be incorporated in the party program. The women's organization of the SPD put priority on class conflict rather than issues specific to women. As a result, the debate over the birth rate decline within the SPD was not led by the women themselves. There could have been various means to stimulate the birth rate. Improvement in the welfare system, such as tax relief for large families, better housing conditions, and substantial maternity protection, could have been feasible solutions to the demographic crisis. However, Germany chose to respond to this crisis by imposing legal sanctions against birth control. In addition to paragraphs 218-220 of the German criminal law enacted in 1872 which prescribed penal servitude for anyone who had an abortion or people who helped to practice it, Paragraph 184.3 of the civil code was enacted in order to outlaw the advertising, display, and publicizing of contraceptives with an 'indecent' intention, although selling or manufacturing contraceptives was not forbidden. Such a punitive approach was especially preferred by the government and conservative parties because it was easy to implement and "cheap" in comparison with the comprehensive social welfare program. What made the SPD different from other conservative parties was the fact that the SPD opposed the government's attempt to prohibit contraception by means of strengthening a penal code. According to the SPD, it was not only morally unacceptable, but also technically impossible for the government to intervene in family limitation. Moreover, politicians from the SPD criticized that such a punitive policy targeted the working class because the upper echelon of the society could easily evade the ban on contraceptives. However, the SPD did not proceed to draft comprehensive social welfare measures in order to fight the fertility decline. The miserable condition of working class women remained as an invisible social phenomenon even within the SPD. The German women who could not find the proper means to practice contraception were driven to have abortions. Annually, hundreds of the women were accused of practicing abortion and imprisoned. In sum, German society ran about in confusion and did not know how to properly respond to the unprecedented decline in fertility. By defining the fertility decline just as a social disease due to moral decay and influence of socialism, German society lost a chance to rationalize itself. Given that women, the main actors, had no way to take part in the debate over this issue, it is not surprising that German society fought against the symptom of the disease, not against its root.
Abortion, Induced/history/legislation & jurisprudence ; *Birth Rate ; Contraception/history ; Family Planning Policy/*history ; Female ; Germany ; History, 19th Century ; History, 20th Century ; Humans ; Politics ; Social Welfare/economics/history