Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.

Since the new medical reform,the scale of public hospitals at all levels and types in China has grown rapidly,resulting in a series of problems such as continued increase in financial burden,excessive growth in health expenses,and serious imbalance in the distribution of social basic medical insurance funds.Due to the ambiguous understanding of the connotation of the scale of China's public hospitals and the underlying driving forces of growth,and the traditional economic explanation of the growth of public hospital scale in China is not convincing.In view of this,revealing the essential driving framework for the scale growth of public hospitals in China from a new economic perspective has become a key theoretical issue to guide the next stage of high-quality development of public hospitals in China.It used the complex system modeling method to measure the growth of China's public hos-pitals since the new medical reform,and summarized the increasingly complex institutional spectrum of contempo-rary public hospitals.Drawing on the perspectives of the system's own costs and system change costs in new insti-tutional economics,starting from the analysis of system costs,it is proposed that under the premise of price regula-tion,it is the best strategy for public hospitals to compensate for institutional costs through scale growth.Finally,based on the three situations of prisoner's dilemma game,deer hunting game,and rule-abiding game experienced by public hospitals since the new health reform,the development path of public hospitals from single scale growth to extended scale growth,and then to collaborative scale growth was summarized.