1.Current status of tuberculosis burden in China
Xinyao WANG ; Meili JIANG ; Yuanjie PANG ; Dianjianyi SUN ; Canqing YU ; Lan WANG ; Jun LYU ; Liming LI
Chinese Journal of Epidemiology 2024;45(6):857-864
Tuberculosis, caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis, is an infectious disease that most often affects the lungs. China is still among the high-burden tuberculosis countries in the world. Although the estimated incidence of tuberculosis in China has declined in recent years, the declining rate is slow. It still faces major issues such as a slower rate of decline, a widening gap between estimated and notified incidence, higher risk among middle-aged and older adults, a high number of cases among agriculture and related workers, and a heavier disease burden in the country's western regions. In addition, latent tuberculosis infection, drug-resistant tuberculosis, tuberculosis coinfection with HIV, and extrapulmonary tuberculosis have also exacerbated the disease burden of tuberculosis to some extent. This paper reviewed the epidemic characteristics of tuberculosis, the epidemiological triad, three links and two factors in the transmission process, the disease burden, and other aspects to provide a reference for formulating prevention and control strategies on tuberculosis.
2.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
3.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
4.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
5.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
6.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
7.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
8.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
9.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Implementation of the Annual Salary System for Principal Officials in Public Hospi-tals
Mian XIA ; Shengjie YIN ; Shuai JIANG ; Meili ZHANG
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(5):5-8
Objective:It explores how to promote the effective implementation of the annual salary system in public hospital.Methods:On the basis of the existing annual salary system reform,through evolutionary game model,it analyzes the key factors that affect strategy selection of government and principal person in charge of hospitals during the implementation of the annual salary sys-tem.Results:In addition to the interaction between behavioral agents,the cost of government supervision,the internal and external pressure of social and administrative systems affect the strategic choice of government.The level and structure of annual salary,the difficulty degree of achieving performance goals and intensity of punishment affect the strategic choice of the main person in charge of hospital.Conclusion:In order to improve the implementation of the annual salary system,government should make a reasonable sala-ry scheme,improve the reward and punishment mechanism and reduce transaction costs.
10.Study on the Correlation among Urine Gal-3BP,VSIG4 Expression Levels,Disease Activity and Kidney Injury in Patients with Systemic Lupus Erythematosus
Meili FU ; Qiang JIANG ; Shiqun ZHOU ; Shushan FU
Journal of Modern Laboratory Medicine 2024;39(4):88-92,115
Objective To investigate the expression of urinary galectin-3 binding protein(Gal-3BP)and V-set containing immunoglobulin domain 4(VSIG4)in urine from patient with systemic lupus erythematosus(SLE)and its relationship with disease activity and kidney injury.Methods A total of 105 SLE patients(SLE group)and 50 normal patients(control group)admitted to Danzhou People's Hospital were selected as the study objects.According to SLEDAI score,105 SLE patients were divided into mild active group(SLEDAI≤9 points,n=51),moderate active group(14 point≥SLEDAI≥10 points,n=29)and severe active group(SLEDAI ≥ 15 points,n=25).According to the degree of renal function impairment,they were divided into normal renal function group,mild renal function impairment group and moderate and severe renal function impairment group.Enzyme linked immunosorbent assay was used to detect the expressions of Gal-3BP and VSIG4.Multiple Logistic regression was applied to analyze the risk factors of kidney injury in SLE patients,and ROC curve was drawn to analyze the value of urinary Gal-3BP and VSIG4 levels in predicting kidney injury in SLE patients.Results The urinary Gal-3BP(251.38±46.75 ng/ml)and VSIG4(13.40±4.27 ng/ml)levels in the SLE group were higher than those in the control group(117.50±18.24 ng/ml,2.73±0.85ng/ml),and the differences were statistically significant(t=19.315,15.681,all P<0.001).The higher the activity level of SLE patients,the higher the urinary Gal-3BP and VSIG4 levels,with severe activity group>moderate activity group>mild activity group,and the differences were statistically significant(F=23.416,17.380,all P<0.001).The urinary Gal-3BP and VSIG4 levels in the moderate to severe renal function group and mild renal function group were higher than those in the normal renal function group(t=24.580,18.163,20.864,15.947),and the urinary Gal-3BP and VSIG4 levels in the moderate to severe renal function group were higher than those in the mild renal function group(t=19.837,11.215),and the differences were statistically significant(all P<0.001),respectively.Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that elevated levels of urinary Gal-3BP(OR=3.472,95%CI:2.685~11.463)and VSIG4(OR=2.376,95%CI:1.842~9.105)were risk factors for renal injury in SLE patients(all P<0.05).ROC curve analysis showed that the combination of Gal-3BP and VSIG4 had the highest area under the curve(95%confidence interval)[AUC(95%CI)]for predicting renal injury in SLE patients[0.909(0.846~0.973)],with an accuracy of 88.6%.Correlation analysis showed that the urinary Gal-3BP level was positively correlated with VSIG4 level(r=0.813,P<0.05),and the levels of urinary Gal-3BP and VSIG4 were positively correlated with SCr,BUN,24-hour urine protein,anti-dsDNA antibodies,and SLEDAI scores(r=0.358~0.702,all P<0.05),while urinary Gal-3BP and VS1G4 levels were negatively correlated with hemoglobin and eGFR in SLE patients(r=-0.479~-0.670,all P<0.05).Conclusion Urinary Gal-3BP and VSIG4 levels are elevated in SLE patients,and their high expressions are related to disease activity and renal injury.The combination of the two have good value in predicting renal injury in SLE patients.

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