HIV/AIDS control in Korea characterized with “AIDS Prevention Law”, enacted in 1987. It was one of the first separate legal enforcement around the world that governs control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yet with significant limitations regarding human rights, as it criminalized HIV infection, and dictates penal action against ‘transmitters’. This papers looks into how HIV/AIDS epidemic started in Korea in 1980s, with specific focus on disease narrative that was constructed by the government. It was known to United States Forces Korea, that HIV was already spreading steady into Korean female sex workers around U.S. military bases in 1985. This information was concealed by Korean Ministry of health, in the face of upcoming international events such as 1988 Seoul Olympics. Instead, the Korean government turned public attention to ‘imported’ cases, constructing narrative that HIV/AIDS as a foreign disease. With direction of president, HIV/AIDS control focus on compulsory testing and isolation of identified risk group of sexual minorities and sex workers around U.S. military bases. This narrative of foreign disease had lasting impact even after democratization of Korea in 1987, as civil society, unaware that HIV/AIDS had already became endemic in Korea, argued to enforced compulsory testing against foreign nationals upon entry. This paper argues that disease narratives were carefully constructed by the government during early phase of HIV/AIDS epidemic in Korea, and used legal structure as ways to conceal the actual prevalence from both domestic and international attention.

HIV/AIDS control in Korea characterized with “AIDS Prevention Law”, enacted in 1987. It was one of the first separate legal enforcement around the world that governs control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yet with significant limitations regarding human rights, as it criminalized HIV infection, and dictates penal action against ‘transmitters’. This papers looks into how HIV/AIDS epidemic started in Korea in 1980s, with specific focus on disease narrative that was constructed by the government. It was known to United States Forces Korea, that HIV was already spreading steady into Korean female sex workers around U.S. military bases in 1985. This information was concealed by Korean Ministry of health, in the face of upcoming international events such as 1988 Seoul Olympics. Instead, the Korean government turned public attention to ‘imported’ cases, constructing narrative that HIV/AIDS as a foreign disease. With direction of president, HIV/AIDS control focus on compulsory testing and isolation of identified risk group of sexual minorities and sex workers around U.S. military bases. This narrative of foreign disease had lasting impact even after democratization of Korea in 1987, as civil society, unaware that HIV/AIDS had already became endemic in Korea, argued to enforced compulsory testing against foreign nationals upon entry. This paper argues that disease narratives were carefully constructed by the government during early phase of HIV/AIDS epidemic in Korea, and used legal structure as ways to conceal the actual prevalence from both domestic and international attention.

HIV/AIDS control in Korea characterized with “AIDS Prevention Law”, enacted in 1987. It was one of the first separate legal enforcement around the world that governs control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yet with significant limitations regarding human rights, as it criminalized HIV infection, and dictates penal action against ‘transmitters’. This papers looks into how HIV/AIDS epidemic started in Korea in 1980s, with specific focus on disease narrative that was constructed by the government. It was known to United States Forces Korea, that HIV was already spreading steady into Korean female sex workers around U.S. military bases in 1985. This information was concealed by Korean Ministry of health, in the face of upcoming international events such as 1988 Seoul Olympics. Instead, the Korean government turned public attention to ‘imported’ cases, constructing narrative that HIV/AIDS as a foreign disease. With direction of president, HIV/AIDS control focus on compulsory testing and isolation of identified risk group of sexual minorities and sex workers around U.S. military bases. This narrative of foreign disease had lasting impact even after democratization of Korea in 1987, as civil society, unaware that HIV/AIDS had already became endemic in Korea, argued to enforced compulsory testing against foreign nationals upon entry. This paper argues that disease narratives were carefully constructed by the government during early phase of HIV/AIDS epidemic in Korea, and used legal structure as ways to conceal the actual prevalence from both domestic and international attention.

HIV/AIDS control in Korea characterized with “AIDS Prevention Law”, enacted in 1987. It was one of the first separate legal enforcement around the world that governs control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yet with significant limitations regarding human rights, as it criminalized HIV infection, and dictates penal action against ‘transmitters’. This papers looks into how HIV/AIDS epidemic started in Korea in 1980s, with specific focus on disease narrative that was constructed by the government. It was known to United States Forces Korea, that HIV was already spreading steady into Korean female sex workers around U.S. military bases in 1985. This information was concealed by Korean Ministry of health, in the face of upcoming international events such as 1988 Seoul Olympics. Instead, the Korean government turned public attention to ‘imported’ cases, constructing narrative that HIV/AIDS as a foreign disease. With direction of president, HIV/AIDS control focus on compulsory testing and isolation of identified risk group of sexual minorities and sex workers around U.S. military bases. This narrative of foreign disease had lasting impact even after democratization of Korea in 1987, as civil society, unaware that HIV/AIDS had already became endemic in Korea, argued to enforced compulsory testing against foreign nationals upon entry. This paper argues that disease narratives were carefully constructed by the government during early phase of HIV/AIDS epidemic in Korea, and used legal structure as ways to conceal the actual prevalence from both domestic and international attention.

South Korea’s national healthcare system after liberation often described as transformation from ‘sanitation’ to ‘public health’. The U.S. military government introduced public health nursing as the primary vehicle for communicating the newly introduced concept of public health to the Korean public. This meant that nursing, which had been in a subordinate position within the healthcare system during the Japanese occupation, had to be repositioned within the healthcare system as an independent and leading professional agent of healthcare. At the same time creating positions for public health nurses within the newly envisioned health center system, and convincing the public that nurses were the primary agents of public health activities. Yet, in resource limited setting, the role of public health nurses was significantly scaled back. Initial plans for institutionalized, community-wide health care through home visits shifted to addressing the challenges facing Korean society, including maternal and child health and infectious disease prevention. Ironically, the expansion of health centers during late 1950s diminished the position of public health nurses within local government health systems, who were gradually replaced by male administrative staff. The role of public health nurses was greatly curtailed in the 1960s, but they laid the groundwork for later community nursing and health care efforts. At the same time, public health nurses were assigned with new role of ‘visiting’ local health centers for observation, education, and management. Public health nursing allows to look beyond the ideological and institutional dimensions to examine how new concepts and practices of “public health” were actually transmitted to communities in post-liberation Korea.

DDT exemplifies success and failure of modern science and technology. Once it was heralded as technological wonder that will deliver human from misery of insect-borne infectious disease. However DDT took dramatic downturn after failure in global malaria eradication program initiated by World Health Organization, with advent of DDT-resistant strain of mosquitoes. Although insecticide resistance has been know since late 19th century, the definitions and mythologies for finding resistance has not been settled until 1950s. This paper argues that discovery of DDT-resistant strain of body lice in prisoners of war camp in Korea during the Korean War provided essential knowledge and opportunity for advancing insecticide resistance studies.
Since 1945 to the end of Korean War, US Army sprayed thousands of tonnes of DDT on Korean body and soil. DDT was only went into wide field application since 1943, was still a very new technology. The ways to deliver and utilize DDT was still under the investigation. And Korea, especially during the War, was ideal place to construct such knowledge and place it in the application. The main focus was to control public health threats, such as louse-borne typhus fever. Korean soldiers and prisoners of war exposed to regular dose of DDT, which soon gave rise to DDT-resistant strain of body lice. It was the first major outbreak of insecticide-resistance appeared in insect that has major public health importance. Until early 1950s, mechanisms of resistance, or even definition of insecticide resistance was unclear. Researchers in US Army and Department of Agriculture rushed to find the ways to quantify insecticide resistance. Network of laboratories, connecting Korea-Japan-US, had to devise new laboratory methods to rear, and test body lice. These body lice later migrate to laboratories in US, providing valuable asset for future insecticide resistance research in US. At the same time, laboratory methods of testing resistance in body louse became a standard across the globe, setting new research agenda through World Health Organization. This shows flow of knowledge, along with migration of body louse, during the Korean War. At the same time, this case show who new knowledge is constructed through the expense of involvement of minority populations, such as natives, soldiers, and prisoners of war.

Nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM) is a type of bacteria that typically infects the pulmonary system, and NTM–central nervous system (CNS) infection, which occurs in the brain, is a very rare disease. A 64-year-old female patient presented with seizures as the main symptom and was found to have a mass of less than 1 cm in the right temporal lobe with accompanying edema. Although diseases such as tumor metastasis and parasitic cyst were suspected, the patient underwent a surgical resection, and NTM-CNS infection with abscess was diagnosed through biopsy. Antibiotic treatment was initiated after surgery, and the patient has been followed up without any significant symptoms. In this report, we review a rare case of NTM-CNS infection and discuss the understanding and treatment of this disease.

In the twenty-first century Korea, “Pristine Vegetables(청정채소, 淸淨菜蔬)” refers to organic products grown without the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers. However, the meaning of “Pristine” was radically different until 1970s. After the Korean War, the infection rate of intestinal parasite reached almost 100 percent in Korean population. Disruption in chemical fertilizers manufacturing pressured farmers to use night-soil, which was contaminated with parasite eggs, causing the vicious cycle of infection. At the same time, rapid urbanization increased the demands of fresh vegetables in the city, leading to a large amount of semi-urban agricultural practices. This was closely linked with the national economy; as most of Korean vegetable products were contaminated with parasites, they were deemed unsuitable for export. In 1957, US Army stationed in Seoul issued a guideline for producing local vegetables acceptable for US troop consumption. This gave rise to the concept of “Pristine Vegetables” that were free of any infectious materials. These practices continued well into the 1970s. Due to the lack of sewage treatment system, the waste of urban population provided necessary fertilizer for these farmers without much cost. In order to secure public health, the Korean government actively encouraged the use of chemical fertilizers, naming the vegetables “Pristine.” This effort included the ban of night-soil in urban and semi-urban farms and the establishment of Pristine Vegetable Shops. However, the rapid decline of parasitic diseases in the population and the rising concerns of environmental pollutions reshaped Pristine Vegetables from chemical to organic in the 1980s. Thus, Pristine Vegetable in Korea during late twentieth century exemplifies rapid transformation of the urban environment, showing shifted concept of cleanness and contaminants among the public and policymakers, as well as acceptable risk of the urban environment in Korea.

The Korean parasite control program is regarded as one of the most successful examples of health care movement in Korea. This ‘Parasite Eradication Program’ which was conducted from 1969 to 1995, involved testing and treating of 300 million people. In cooperation with Japan, parasitologists and activists who participated in the parasite control program formed a common system called the ‘Mass Testing, Mass Treatment.’ This study focuses on the localization process of Praziquantel, Clonorchiasis treatment production and its application in Clonorchiasis control program. Parasitologists rapidly introduced newly developed Praziquantel, and Korean chemists quickly reverse engineered the compound to evade patent issues. This allowed for the mass production of Praziquantel at a lower price, which in turn enabled a nationwide Clonorchiasis control program. At the same time, low price and stable supply opened the private market for Praziquantel. However, acceptance and understanding of the Praziquantel differed significantly among the stakeholders. For the government, it was a means for policy propaganda, and for the health agencies, it was a means for mass scale control program, while for the public, it was a means for maintaining conventional eating habits without risk of infection. This study reveals how the material end of a disease control policy is accepted and interpreted by different actors.

The Korean parasite control program is regarded as one of the most successful examples of health care movement in Korea. This ‘Parasite Eradication Program’ which was conducted from 1969 to 1995, involved testing and treating of 300 million people. In cooperation with Japan, parasitologists and activists who participated in the parasite control program formed a common system called the ‘Mass Testing, Mass Treatment.’ This study focuses on the localization process of Praziquantel, Clonorchiasis treatment production and its application in Clonorchiasis control program. Parasitologists rapidly introduced newly developed Praziquantel, and Korean chemists quickly reverse engineered the compound to evade patent issues. This allowed for the mass production of Praziquantel at a lower price, which in turn enabled a nationwide Clonorchiasis control program. At the same time, low price and stable supply opened the private market for Praziquantel. However, acceptance and understanding of the Praziquantel differed significantly among the stakeholders. For the government, it was a means for policy propaganda, and for the health agencies, it was a means for mass scale control program, while for the public, it was a means for maintaining conventional eating habits without risk of infection. This study reveals how the material end of a disease control policy is accepted and interpreted by different actors.