From February 2013, a novel avian influenza A H7N9 virus causing human infection with fatal outcomes has been identified in eastern China. This avian influenza A H7N9 virus is a triple reassortant of viruses that are avian-origin only and it is low pathogenic in poultry. Several characteristic amino acid mutations in HA and PB2 polymerase subunit (including G186V, Q226L and E627K substitution) have been found through sequence analysis, and these mutations probably facilitate binding to human-type receptors and efficient replication in mammals. Other mutations in NA, M2 and NS genes were also found. Although sustained human-to-human transmission has not been conclusively established, limited human-to-human transmission of the H7N9 virus remains possible. Intensified surveillance for the H7N9 virus in humans and animals is needed to answer questions about the viral origin, spread and potential threat.
Animals ; Birds ; virology ; China ; epidemiology ; Humans ; Influenza A virus ; genetics ; Influenza in Birds ; virology ; Influenza, Human ; transmission ; virology ; Mutation

Wild birds (mainly Anseriformes and Charadriiformes) are recognized as the natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses (AIVs). The long-term surveillance of AIVs in wild birds has been conducted in North America and Europe since 1970s. More and more surveillance data revealed that all the HA and NA subtypes of AIVs were identified in the wild ducks, shorebirds, and gulls, and the AIVs circulating in wild birds were implicated in the outbreaks of AIVs in poultry and humans. Therefore, the AIVs in wild birds pose huge threat to poultry industry and human health. To gain a better understanding of the ecology and epidemiology of AIVs in wild birds, we summarize the transmission of AIVs between wild birds, poultry, and humans, the main results of surveillance of AIVs in wild birds worldwide and methods for surveillance, and the types of samples and detection methods for AIVs in wild birds, which would be vital for the effective control of avian influenza and response to possible influenza pandemic.
Animals ; Animals, Wild ; virology ; Birds ; virology ; Humans ; Influenza A virus ; genetics ; isolation & purification ; physiology ; Influenza in Birds ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology ; Influenza, Human ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology ; Sentinel Surveillance ; veterinary

Animals ; Birds ; virology ; China ; epidemiology ; Computer Communication Networks ; Epidemiologic Methods ; Influenza A Virus, H7N9 Subtype ; isolation & purification ; Influenza in Birds ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology

The recent human infection with avian influenza virus revealed that H9N2 influenza virus is the gene donor for H7N9 and H10N8 viruses infecting humans. The crucial role of H9N2 viruses at the animal-human interface might be due to the wide host range, adaptation in both poultry and mammalian, and extensive gene reassortment. As the most prevalent subtype of influenza viruses in chickens in China, H9N2 also causes a great economic loss for the poultry industry, even under the long-term vaccination programs. The history, epidemiology, biological characteristics, and molecular determinants of H9N2 influenza virus are reviewed in this paper. The contribution of H9N2 genes, especially RNP genes, to the infection of humans needs to be investigated in the future.
Animals ; Chickens ; virology ; China ; epidemiology ; Humans ; Influenza A Virus, H7N9 Subtype ; genetics ; Influenza A Virus, H9N2 Subtype ; genetics ; immunology ; physiology ; Influenza in Birds ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology ; Influenza, Human ; epidemiology ; transmission ; virology ; Vaccination ; Viral Proteins ; classification ; metabolism

In 2014, two genetically distinct H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses were isolated from poultry and wild birds in Korea. The intravenous pathogenicity indices for the two representative viruses were both 3.0. Mortality of chickens intranasally inoculated with the two H5N8 viruses was 100% with a mean death times of 2.5 and 4.5 days. Mortality rates of the contact groups for the two H5N8 viruses were 33.3% and 66.6%. Our study showed that transmissibility of the novel H5N8 viruses was different from that of previously identified H5N1 HPAI viruses, possibly due to genetic changes.
Animals ; Chickens ; Disease Outbreaks/veterinary ; Influenza A virus/*pathogenicity/*physiology ; Influenza in Birds/*mortality/transmission/virology ; Poultry Diseases/*mortality/transmission/virology ; Republic of Korea/epidemiology ; Virulence

Avian influenza has emerged as one of the primary public health concern of the 21st century. Influenza strain H5N1 is capable of incidentally infecting humans and other mammals. Since their reemergence in 2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses have been transmitted from poultry to humans (by direct or indirect contact with infected birds) in several provinces of Mainland China, which has resulted in 22 cases of human infection and has created repercussions for the Chinese economy. People have been concerned whether a new pandemic will occur in the future. The eradication of pathogenic avian influenza viruses appears to be the most effective way to prevent an influenza pandemic. This paper will examine the features of H5N1, including incidence, infection, immunity, clinical management, prevention and control, and therapy in Mainland China.
Adolescent ; Adult ; Animals ; Birds ; Child ; China/epidemiology ; Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control ; Female ; Humans ; Incidence ; *Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype ; Influenza in Birds/prevention & control ; Influenza, Human/*epidemiology/immunology/therapy ; Male ; Zoonoses/epidemiology/transmission/virology

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) of the H5N1 subtype have spread since 2003 in poultry and wild birds in Asia, Europe and Africa. In Korea, the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks took place in 2003/2004, 2006/2007 and 2008. As the 2006/2007 isolates differ phylogenetically from the 2003/2004 isolates, we assessed the clinical responses of chickens, ducks and quails to intranasal inoculation of the 2006/2007 index case virus, A/chicken/Korea/IS/06. All the chickens and quails died on 3 days and 3-6 days post-inoculation (DPI), respectively, whilst the ducks only showed signs of mild depression. The uninoculated chickens and quails placed soon after with the inoculated flock died on 5.3 and 7.5 DPI, respectively. Both oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were taken for all three species during various time intervals after inoculation. It was found that oropharyngeal swabs showed higher viral titers than in cloacal swabs applicable to all three avian species. The chickens and quails shed the virus until they died (up to 3 to 6 days after inoculation, respectively) whilst the ducks shed the virus on 2-4 DPI. The postmortem tissues collected from the chickens and quails on day 3 and days 4-5 and from clinically normal ducks that were euthanized on day 4 contained the virus. However, the ducks had significantly lower viral titers than the chickens or quails. Thus, the three avian species varied significantly in their clinical signs, mortality, tissue virus titers, and duration of virus shedding. Our observations suggest that duck and quail farms should be monitored particularly closely for the presence of HPAIV so that further virus transmission to other avian or mammalian hosts can be prevented.
Animals ; Antibodies, Viral/blood ; Brain/virology ; *Chickens ; *Coturnix ; *Ducks ; Heart/virology ; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/*pathogenicity ; Influenza in Birds/epidemiology/transmission/*virology ; Kidney/virology ; Korea/epidemiology ; Lung/virology ; Virus Shedding

INTRODUCTIONAs the country hardest hit by avian influenza, both in poultry and in human, Indonesia's decision to withhold samples of avian influenza virus A (H5N1) has fired up a global controversy. The objective of this paper is to describe the position taken by Indonesia in the events leading to the decision and in those conducted to resolve the situation.

METHODSThe sources for this paper are the Indonesian human influenza A(H5N1) case reports and study results, summaries, minutes and reports of national and international meetings of virus sharing, and other related Indonesian and WHO documents.

RESULTSThe International Health Regulations 2005 have been applied in different ways based on different interpretations. While one party insists on the importance of free, non-conditional, virus sharing for risk assessment and risk response, Indonesia--as supported by most of the developing countries--stresses on the more basic principles such as sovereignty of a country over its biological materials, transparency of the global system, and equity between developed and developing nations.

CONCLUSIONSThis event demonstrates the unresolved imbalance between the affluent high-tech countries and the poor agriculture-based countries. Regional, global and in-country meetings must continue to be conducted to find solutions acceptable to all.

Animals ; Birds ; Communication ; Cooperative Behavior ; Global Health ; Humans ; Indonesia ; epidemiology ; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype ; isolation & purification ; Influenza in Birds ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; transmission ; virology ; International Cooperation ; legislation & jurisprudence ; Risk Factors ; Trust

Animals ; Antiviral Agents ; administration & dosage ; therapeutic use ; Birds ; China ; Communicable Disease Control ; Disaster Planning ; methods ; organization & administration ; Disease Outbreaks ; prevention & control ; Global Health ; Humans ; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype ; immunology ; Influenza Vaccines ; administration & dosage ; therapeutic use ; Influenza in Birds ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; transmission ; virology ; Influenza, Human ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; transmission ; virology ; Poultry ; Vaccination

INTRODUCTIONWith the potential threat of an avian influenza (AI) pandemic, healthcare workers (HCWs) are expected to play important roles, and they encounter significant stress levels from an expected increase in workload. We compared the concerns, perceived impact and preparedness for an AI pandemic between HCWs working in public primary care clinics and a tertiary healthcare setting.

MATERIALS AND METHODSAn anonymous, self-administered questionnaire was given to 2459 HCWs working at 18 public polyclinics (PCs) and a tertiary hospital (TH) in Singapore from March to June 2006. The questionnaire assessed work-related and non-work-related concerns, perceived impact on personal life and work as well as workplace preparedness.

RESULTSWe obtained responses from 986 PC and 873 TH HCWs (response rate: 74.6% and 76.7%). The majority in both groups were concerned about the high AI risk from their occupation (82.7%) and falling ill with AI (75.9%). 71.9% accepted the risk but 25.5% felt that they should not be looking after AI patients with 15.0% consider resigning. HCWs also felt that people would avoid them (63.5%) and their families (54.1%) during a pandemic. The majority expected an increased workload and to feel more stressed at work. For preparedness, 74.2% felt personally prepared and 83.7% felt that their workplaces were prepared for an outbreak. TH HCWs were more likely to be involved in infection-control activities but the perception of infection-control preparedness in both groups was high (>80.0%).

CONCLUSIONSHCWs in both public primary and tertiary healthcare settings felt prepared, personally and in their workplaces, for a pandemic. Their main concerns were risks of falling ill from exposure and the possibility of social ostracism of themselves and their families. Preparedness levels appeared high in the majority of HCWs. However, concerns of HCWs could affect their overall effectiveness in a pandemic and should be addressed by incorporating strategies to manage them in pandemic planning.

Adolescent ; Adult ; Aged ; Animals ; Attitude of Health Personnel ; Birds ; Disaster Planning ; Disease Outbreaks ; Female ; Humans ; Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional ; prevention & control ; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype ; pathogenicity ; Influenza in Birds ; transmission ; Influenza, Human ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; transmission ; virology ; Male ; Middle Aged ; Primary Health Care ; Singapore