1.Global health security in the post-COVID-19 era: threats, preparation, and response
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2025;16(2):116-125
Global health security threats in the post-coronavirus disease 2019 era include dense urban populations, increased human–animal proximity, migration driven by political or economic instability, climate change, humanitarian crises, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and the misuse of biological research—including the accidental or intentional release of high-risk pathogens. The foundational preparation for these threats is to establish a robust, resilient public health system based on universal health coverage. The World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations must continue to promote global solidarity by maintaining core capacities such as surveillance, national laboratories, and epidemiological investigations of emerging infectious diseases, with timely reporting and information sharing within the global health security community. A One Health approach is essential for addressing AMR.Infection prevention and control must be enhanced to reduce healthcare-associated infections in medical facilities. Additionally, regulations concerning biosafety and biosecurity should address dual-use research of concern as well as the accidental or intentional release of highrisk pathogens from laboratories. Global health security is a collective responsibility because these threats know no borders and require coordinated action.
2.Global health security in the post-COVID-19 era: threats, preparation, and response
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2025;16(2):116-125
Global health security threats in the post-coronavirus disease 2019 era include dense urban populations, increased human–animal proximity, migration driven by political or economic instability, climate change, humanitarian crises, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and the misuse of biological research—including the accidental or intentional release of high-risk pathogens. The foundational preparation for these threats is to establish a robust, resilient public health system based on universal health coverage. The World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations must continue to promote global solidarity by maintaining core capacities such as surveillance, national laboratories, and epidemiological investigations of emerging infectious diseases, with timely reporting and information sharing within the global health security community. A One Health approach is essential for addressing AMR.Infection prevention and control must be enhanced to reduce healthcare-associated infections in medical facilities. Additionally, regulations concerning biosafety and biosecurity should address dual-use research of concern as well as the accidental or intentional release of highrisk pathogens from laboratories. Global health security is a collective responsibility because these threats know no borders and require coordinated action.
3.Global health security in the post-COVID-19 era: threats, preparation, and response
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2025;16(2):116-125
Global health security threats in the post-coronavirus disease 2019 era include dense urban populations, increased human–animal proximity, migration driven by political or economic instability, climate change, humanitarian crises, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and the misuse of biological research—including the accidental or intentional release of high-risk pathogens. The foundational preparation for these threats is to establish a robust, resilient public health system based on universal health coverage. The World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations must continue to promote global solidarity by maintaining core capacities such as surveillance, national laboratories, and epidemiological investigations of emerging infectious diseases, with timely reporting and information sharing within the global health security community. A One Health approach is essential for addressing AMR.Infection prevention and control must be enhanced to reduce healthcare-associated infections in medical facilities. Additionally, regulations concerning biosafety and biosecurity should address dual-use research of concern as well as the accidental or intentional release of highrisk pathogens from laboratories. Global health security is a collective responsibility because these threats know no borders and require coordinated action.
4.Global health security in the post-COVID-19 era: threats, preparation, and response
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2025;16(2):116-125
Global health security threats in the post-coronavirus disease 2019 era include dense urban populations, increased human–animal proximity, migration driven by political or economic instability, climate change, humanitarian crises, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and the misuse of biological research—including the accidental or intentional release of high-risk pathogens. The foundational preparation for these threats is to establish a robust, resilient public health system based on universal health coverage. The World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations must continue to promote global solidarity by maintaining core capacities such as surveillance, national laboratories, and epidemiological investigations of emerging infectious diseases, with timely reporting and information sharing within the global health security community. A One Health approach is essential for addressing AMR.Infection prevention and control must be enhanced to reduce healthcare-associated infections in medical facilities. Additionally, regulations concerning biosafety and biosecurity should address dual-use research of concern as well as the accidental or intentional release of highrisk pathogens from laboratories. Global health security is a collective responsibility because these threats know no borders and require coordinated action.
5.Global health security in the post-COVID-19 era: threats, preparation, and response
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2025;16(2):116-125
Global health security threats in the post-coronavirus disease 2019 era include dense urban populations, increased human–animal proximity, migration driven by political or economic instability, climate change, humanitarian crises, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and the misuse of biological research—including the accidental or intentional release of high-risk pathogens. The foundational preparation for these threats is to establish a robust, resilient public health system based on universal health coverage. The World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations must continue to promote global solidarity by maintaining core capacities such as surveillance, national laboratories, and epidemiological investigations of emerging infectious diseases, with timely reporting and information sharing within the global health security community. A One Health approach is essential for addressing AMR.Infection prevention and control must be enhanced to reduce healthcare-associated infections in medical facilities. Additionally, regulations concerning biosafety and biosecurity should address dual-use research of concern as well as the accidental or intentional release of highrisk pathogens from laboratories. Global health security is a collective responsibility because these threats know no borders and require coordinated action.
6.Watch Your Waistline.
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2018;9(2):43-44
No abstract available.
Essential Hypertension
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Obesity
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Waist Circumference
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Body Mass Index
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Humans
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Male
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Female
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Cardiovascular Diseases
7.Estimation of the Size of Dengue and Zika Infection Among Korean Travelers to Southeast Asia and Latin America, 2016–2017
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2019;10(6):394-398
OBJECTIVES: To estimate the number and risk of imported infections resulting from people visiting Asian and Latin American countries.METHODS: The dataset of visitors to 5 Asian countries with dengue were analyzed for 2016 and 2017, and in the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, imported cases of zika virus infection were also reported. For zika virus, a single imported case was reported from Brazil in 2016, and 2 imported cases reported from the Maldives in 2017. To understand the transmissibility in 5 Southeast Asian countries, the estimate of the force of infection, i.e., the hazard of infection per year and the average duration of travel has been extracted. Outbound travel numbers were retrieved from the World Tourism Organization, including business travelers.RESULTS: The incidence of imported dengue in 2016 was estimated at 7.46, 15.00, 2.14, 4.73 and 2.40 per 100,000 travelers visiting Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, respectively. Similarly, 2.55, 1.65, 1.53, 1.86 and 1.70 per 100,000 travelers in 2017, respectively. It was estimated that there were 60.1 infections (range: from 16.8 to 150.7 infections) with zika virus in Brazil, 2016, and 345.6 infections (range: from 85.4 to 425.5 infections) with zika virus in the Maldives, 2017.CONCLUSION: This study emphasizes that dengue and zika virus infections are mild in their nature, and a substantial number of infections may go undetected. An appropriate risk assessment of zika virus infection must use the estimated total size of infections.
Asia, Southeastern
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Asian Continental Ancestry Group
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Brazil
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Commerce
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Dataset
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Dengue
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Humans
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Incidence
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Indian Ocean Islands
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Indonesia
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Korea
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Latin America
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Malaysia
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Philippines
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Risk Assessment
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Thailand
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Vietnam
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Zika Virus
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Zika Virus Infection
8.A Joint Exercise against Intentional Biothreats
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2018;9(1):1-2
No abstract available.
Joints
9.Seroprevalence and Risk Factors of Brucellosis among Slaughterhouse Workers in Korea.
Seok Ju YOO ; Young Sill CHOI ; Hyun Sul LIM ; Kwan LEE ; Mi Yeoun PARK ; Chaeshin CHU ; Young A KANG
Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health 2009;42(4):237-242
OBJECTIVES: The incidence of zoonoses in Korea has increased recently. However, the study of high risk groups for zoonoses has not been conducted to date in Korea. Thus, we did this study to obtain data on brucellosis among slaughterhouse workers in Korea. METHODS: We evaluated the structure of slaughterhouses and the process of slaughtering by reviewing the relevant literature and doing field studies. We visited 73 slaughterhouses and 62 residual products handle houses across the country. In addition, we conducted a questionnaire survey of the work activities, and obtained blood samples in order to determine the seroprevalence and risk factors of brucellosis. The titers of brucellosis antibodies were measured using the standard tube agglutination test (SAT). We diagnosed subjects as seropositive for Brucellosis if the titers were more than 1:160. The data collected was evaluated using SPSS ver. 17.0. RESULTS: We included 1,503 subjects and obtained 1,482 blood samples among them: 849 workers involved in slaughtering, 351 handlers of residual products, 190 inspectors and their assistants, and 92 grading testers and their assistants. The seroprevalence of brucellosis among the slaughterhouse workers was 0.8% (95% CI=0.4-1.5). Broken down, the seroprevalence of brucellosis among the workers involved in slaughtering was 0.7% (95% CI=0.3-1.6), the handlers of residual products was 1.7% (95% CI=0.7-3.9) respectively. Risk factors for contracting brucellosis among slaughterhouse workers were being splashed with cattle blood around the mouth, cattle secretions around the body and not putting on protective apron while at work. CONCLUSIONS: An educational program is needed for high risk groups on zoonoses about the prevention of infection. Thus, effective working guidelines for workers who participate in the slaughter of animals must be developed in order to protect them from zoonoses.
*Abattoirs
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Animals
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Brucellosis/blood/*epidemiology
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Cattle
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Humans
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Korea/epidemiology
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Occupational Diseases/blood/*epidemiology/microbiology
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*Occupational Exposure
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Seroepidemiologic Studies
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Zoonoses/epidemiology/microbiology
10.To Be or Not to Be.
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives 2017;8(3):157-158
No abstract available.