Absenteeism ; Emergency Service, Hospital ; Hospitals, General ; Humans ; Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype ; Influenza, Human ; epidemiology ; Personnel, Hospital ; Sentinel Surveillance ; Singapore ; epidemiology

<p>INTRODUCTIONThe current avian and human H5N1 influenza epidemic has been in resurgence since 2004. We decided to evaluate published evidence in relation to epidemiology, clinical features and course, laboratory diagnosis, treatment and outcome of human H5N1 influenza, and develop institutional clinical management guidelines.p><p>METHODSA search of PubMed was conducted for all English language articles with search terms "avian", "influenza" and "H5N1". The bibliography of articles was searched for other references of interest.p><p>RESULTSPublished case series from Hong Kong in 1997, and Thailand and Vietnam since 2004 have indicated a rapidly progressive primary viral pneumonia resulting in acute respiratory distress syndrome. The majority of human H5N1 infections can be linked to poultry exposure. Hitherto there has been no evidence of efficient human-to-human transmission. Case fatality rates have varied from 71% in Thailand to 100% in Cambodia. Oseltamivir appears to be the only potentially effective antiviral therapy. H5N1 isolates in Vietnam have become resistant to oseltamivir, resulting in persistent viral replication and death. There is as yet no effective human H5N1 vaccine.p><p>CONCLUSIONSNational and international preparedness plans are well advised. Clinical trials to evaluate higher dose oseltamivir therapy and immunomodulatory treatment are urgently needed.p>
Animals ; Birds ; Disease Outbreaks ; prevention & control ; Global Health ; Health Planning ; Humans ; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype ; Influenza Vaccines ; Influenza in Birds ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; virology ; Influenza, Human ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; virology ; Practice Guidelines as Topic

<p>INTRODUCTIONThe outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) began after the index case was admitted on 1 March 2003. We profile the cases suspected to have acquired the infection in Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH), focussing on major transmission foci, and also describe and discuss the impact of our outbreak control measures.p><p>MATERIALS AND METHODSUsing the World Health Organization (WHO) case definitions for probable SARS adapted to the local context, we studied all cases documented to have passed through TTSH less than 10 days prior to the onset of fever. Key data were collected in liaison with clinicians and through a team of onsite epidemiologists.p><p>RESULTSThere were 105 secondary cases in TTSH. Healthcare staff (57.1%) formed the majority, followed by visitors (30.5%) and inpatients (12.4%). The earliest case had onset of fever on 4 March 2003, and the last case, on 5 April 2003. Eighty-nine per cent had exposures to 7 wards which had cases of SARS that were not isolated on admission. In 3 of these wards, major outbreaks resulted, each with more than 20 secondary cases. Attack rates amongst ward-based staff ranged from 0% to 32.5%. Of 13 inpatients infected, only 4 (30.8%) had been in the same room or cubicle as the index case for the ward.p><p>CONCLUSIONSThe outbreak of SARS at TTSH showed the challenges of dealing with an emerging infectious disease with efficient nosocomial spread. Super-spreading events and initial delays in outbreak response led to widespread dissemination of the outbreak to multiple wards.p>
Adolescent ; Adult ; Aged ; Aged, 80 and over ; Cross Infection ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; Disease Outbreaks ; Female ; Follow-Up Studies ; Humans ; Male ; Middle Aged ; Patient Isolation ; methods ; Retrospective Studies ; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ; epidemiology ; prevention & control ; Singapore ; epidemiology