We have examined isolation and identification protocols for three virus simulant candidates to biological warfare agents. MS2 phage, a simulant for yellow fever virus and Hantaan virus, was propagated using as a host an E. coli strain with F pilus. MS2 phage genome was examined by reverse transcription and polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Coat protein of the phage preparation was examined by SDS-polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (SDS-PAGE) and mass spectrometric analysis. Cydia pomonella granulosis virus (CpGV) is a virus simulant candidate to smallpox virus. CpGV was isolated from a commercialized CpGV pellet. In this study, we developed new isolation and identification protocols for CpGV. One disadvantage of using CpGV is that it is not easy to determine viability of the virus. Here, we have included T4 phage as an alternative. We established a high titer production protocol and developed an easy genome identification protocol that does not require purified phage DNA. Stability of these virus preparations was also examined under various storage conditions. When the virus preparations were not subjected to freeze drying, MS2 phage was most stable when it was stored in liquid nitrogen but unstable at 4℃. In contrast, T4 phage was most stable when it was stored at 4℃. CpGV was stable at −20℃ but not at 4℃. Stability during or after freeze drying was also investigated. The result showed that 70~80% MS2 survived the freeze drying process. In contrast, only about 15% of T4 phage survived during the freeze drying. CpGV was found to be degraded during freeze drying.
Bacteriophage T4 ; Bacteriophages ; Biological Warfare Agents ; DNA ; Electrophoresis ; Freeze Drying ; Genome ; Granulovirus ; Hantaan virus ; Levivirus ; Nitrogen ; Polymerase Chain Reaction ; Reverse Transcription ; Variola virus ; Yellow fever virus

Serratia marcescens (S. marcescens) emerged as an opportunist in the setting of immunodeficiency in the 1970s, when serious infections occurred in San Francisco hospitals after USA. Navy experiments had aerosolized the bacteria to study biologic warfare. We investigate the risks of S. marcescens in San Franciscans who undergo mastectomy with implant reconstruction. From 2007 to 2011, the senior author took breast capsule cultures for all patients at the time of tissue expander exchange/explant. Of the 142 women who had reconstruction, 23 had positive cultures. Only the two patients who were positive for S. marcescens developed clinical infections that required explantation. Both had postoperative chemotherapy with transient neutropenia, and both had close ties to San Francisco. Clinical signs of infection emerged for both patients months after initial surgery, despite having previously well healed incisions. Other patients were culture positive for Pseudomonas, Proteus, Enterococcus and MRSA and did not develop require explant. While the link between San Francisco and S. marcescens is controversial, a patient's geography is a simple screening tool when considering postoperative risks, especially in the immunocompromised. Closer monitoring for neutropenia during chemotherapy, and a lower threshold to administer S. marcescens targeted antibiotics may be warranted in these patients.
Anti-Bacterial Agents ; Bacteria ; Biological Warfare ; Breast ; Breast Implants* ; Device Removal ; Drug Therapy ; Enterococcus ; Female ; Geography ; Humans ; Mass Screening ; Mastectomy ; Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus ; Neutropenia ; Proteus ; Pseudomonas ; Risk Factors* ; Serratia ; Serratia marcescens* ; Tissue Expansion Devices

The Laboratories engaging with microorganisms have some potential risks, depending on handling of pathogens. The safety management system to extend recognition of biosafety and biosecurity needs to be established and practiced in order to prevent hazard possibility and secure safety of researchers who deal with pathogen. As the importance and regulation of global biosafety and biosecurity tended to be intensified, various laws and institutions for the security of biosafety were established when the Act on implementation of Living Modified Organisms, an implantation act of Cartagena was enforced in Korea in 2008. In particular, the system of permission report for Living Modified Organism (LMO), Highly Dangerous Pathogens (HDPs) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in order to prevent intended or non-intended leakage and occurrence of biohazard derived from pathogen and infectious substance and safely use them. The bioterrorism can be controlled and autonomous management of biosafety by agencies that handle pathogens can be also secured by practicing the various laws and institutions.
Biological Warfare Agents ; Bioterrorism ; Jurisprudence ; Korea ; Safety Management

The management of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) terrorism events is critical to reducing morbidity and mortality in the next decade; however, initial patient care considerations and protective actions for staff are unfamiliar to most front-line clinicians. High explosive events (bomb and blast) remain the most common type of terrorism and are easy to detect. Conversely, some types of terrorist attacks are more likely to be unsuspected or covert. This paper explains the current threat of terrorism and describes clues for detection that an event has occurred. Specific criteria that should lead to a high suspicion for terrorism are illustrated. The manuscript outlines initial actions and clinical priorities for management and treatment of patients exposed to nuclear/radiological, biological, chemical and combined agents (for example an explosion involving a chemical agent). Examples of terrorist events include: a nuclear explosion, an aerosolised release of anthrax (biological), dissemination of sarin in a subway (chemical), and the detonation of a radiologic dispersion device or "dirty bomb" (combined explosive and radiological). Basic principles of decontamination include potential risks to healthcare providers from secondary exposure and contamination. Unique issues may hinder clinical actions. These include coordination with law enforcement for a crime scene, public health entities for surveillance and monitoring, hazardous materials teams for decontamination, and the media for risk communications. Finally, the importance of personal preparedness is discussed.
Biological Warfare Agents ; Chemical Warfare Agents ; Civil Defense ; Nuclear Weapons ; Terrorism

In 1945, many Koreans, in addition to Japanese, were killed or injured by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. This study compared the biological profiles of Korean atomic bomb survivors in residence at Daegu and Kyungbuk, Republic of Korea with those of a representative sample of Koreans obtained during a similar period. We evaluated anthropometric measurements, blood pressure, blood cell counts, blood chemistry, and urinalysis of survivors (n=414) and age- and sex-matched controls (n=414) recruited from the third Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey conducted in 2005. Univariate analyses revealed significantly higher systolic blood pressure, white blood cell count, and serum total cholesterol, triglycerides, high-density lipoprotein-cholesterol, and aspartate aminotransferase levels (p<0.01) in the survivors. Conversely, hemoglobin concentration, hematocrit, red blood cell count, and the proportion of positive urine occult blood (p<0.01) were lower in the survivors. Our findings suggest that biological profiles of Korean atomic bomb survivors were adversely affected by radiation exposure.
Abnormalities, Radiation-Induced ; Aged ; Biological Markers/analysis ; Female ; Humans ; Japan ; Korea ; Male ; *Nuclear Warfare ; Radiation Injuries/diagnosis/*metabolism ; Radioactive Fallout ; Survivors

PURPOSE: To investigate different emergency medical centers' (EMCs) preparedness for a biological disaster in Korea. METHODS: A survey of 120 EMCs in Korea was done through questionnaire. We examined facilities, equipments and supplies, and emergency personnel training and drill. RESULTS: Ninety (75%) EMCs participated in the survey. Sixteen were from regional/specialized EMCs and 74 were from local EMCs. The median for the number of staffed beds were 680(range, 200~2200) and the median for patient visits were 73(range, 24~210) per day. Ten(11%) of the 90 participating EMCs had personal protective equipments (PPEs); 7(8%) had wet decontamination units; 11(12%) had independent ventilation systems; 15(17%) had mechanical ventilator; 9(10%) had life lines; 39(43%) had alternative care sites and none (0%) had triage tag with presence of contamination. At least one drill was conducted annually in 11(12%). When the availability of resources needed in a biological disaster between regional/specialized EMCs and local EMCs were compared, the regional/specialized EMCs had PPEs(38% vs. 5%, p<0.01), wet decontamination unit(44% vs. 0%, p<0.01), independent ventilation systems (31% vs. 8%, p<0.05), and drills (38% vs. 7%, p<0.01) more frequently than local EMCs. Approximately 70% of the respondents attributed the above passive preparedness results from a lack of budget and the notion that only the minimum preparedness is necessary for the possibility of a biological disaster. Also, half of the respondents agreed that new infectious diseases will occur with a possibility of more than 50% in the future. CONCLUSION: Our data indicated that preparedness of EMCs for a biological disaster in Korea was low. Therefore, we should develop comprehensive plans to remedy the identified deficiencies.
Biological Warfare ; Budgets ; Civil Defense ; Communicable Diseases ; Surveys and Questionnaires ; Decontamination ; Disaster Planning ; Disasters ; Emergencies ; Equipment and Supplies ; Humans ; Korea ; Mandrillus ; Triage ; Ventilation

A total of 1,618 ticks [420 individual (adults) and pooled (larvae and nymphs) samples], 369 rodents (Apodemus arius, Rattus norvegicus, Tscherskia triton, Mus musculus, and Myodes regulus), and 34 shrews (Crocidura lasiura) that were collected in northern Gyeonggi-do near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) of Korea during 2004-2005, were assayed by PCR for selected zoonotic pathogens. From a total of 420 individual and pooled tick DNA samples, Anaplasma (A.) phagocytophilum (16), A. platys (16), Ehrlichia (E.) chaffeensis (63), Borrelia burgdorferi (16), and Rickettsia spp. (198) were detected using species-specific PCR assays. Out of 403 spleens from rodents and shrews, A. phagocytophilum (20), A. platys (34), E. chaffeensis (127), and Bartonella spp. (24) were detected with species-specific PCR assays. These results suggest that fevers of unknown causes in humans and animals in Korea should be evaluated for infections by these vector-borne microbial pathogens.
Anaplasma phagocytophilum/genetics/isolation & purification ; Animals ; Biological Warfare ; DNA, Bacterial/genetics/isolation & purification ; Ehrlichiosis/transmission/veterinary ; Humans ; Korea ; Mice/*microbiology ; Rats/*microbiology ; Seasons ; Shrews/*microbiology ; Ticks/*microbiology ; Zoonoses

Animals ; Biological Warfare ; Burns ; pathology ; Burns, Chemical ; pathology ; Chemical Warfare ; China ; Humans ; Military Medicine ; Radiation Injuries ; pathology ; Wounds, Gunshot ; pathology

Biological Warfare Agents ; China ; Disaster Planning ; Emergencies ; economics ; Laboratories ; economics ; Public Health Administration

Human anthrax has been a zoonotic disease affecting those who have close contact with animals or animal products contaminated with the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis. Now the incidence of anthrax in herbivores and human are rare, but it remains an important health problem in Korea because anthrax is seen as one of the most likely biological weapon. The B. anthracis forms a spore, which is resistant to drought, heat and numerous disinfectants, and the spore can remain viable and infective in the environment for decades. There are three major forms of human disease depending on how infection is contracted, cutaneous, inhalation and ingestion. Inhalational anthrax is the most common form, but the events in the Korea show that gastrointestinal anthrax is the most common. Several cases of anthrax have been reported in Korea. In recent years, 2 cases of bovine anthrax and 5 cases of human anthrax occurred in Changnyeong-gun, 2000, but it haven't occurred any more so far. The most useful microbiological test remains the standard blood culture. Confirmatory diagnostic tests such as polymerase chain reaction can also be used and may help in early diagnosis. Prompt clinical suspicion and rapid administration of effective antimicrobials are essential for treatment of anthrax. Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline should be used for initial intravenous therapy until antimicrobial susceptibility results are known. The best measure to eliminate human anthrax is control in domestic animals by effective surveillance and by immunization of animals in endemic areas. Also, the government must establish countplan for knowledge and rational policies in dealing with potential bioterrorism attacks.
Animals ; Animals, Domestic ; Anthrax* ; Bacillus anthracis ; Biological Warfare Agents ; Bioterrorism ; Ciprofloxacin ; Diagnostic Tests, Routine ; Disinfectants ; Doxycycline ; Droughts ; Early Diagnosis ; Eating ; Herbivory ; Hot Temperature ; Humans ; Immunization ; Incidence ; Inhalation ; Korea ; Polymerase Chain Reaction ; Spores ; Zoonoses