1.Analyzing Credit Level Appraisal on Designated Medical Instituions under New Rural Cooperative Medical System in Jiangsu
Chinese Health Economics 2013;(12):49-51
Objective: Through evaluating the creadit level appraisal of designated medical institutions under new rural cooperative medical system ( NCMS) , effective method of standard management for NCMS designated medical institutions under was proposed. Methods:Use third-party evaluation to evaluate the 27 NCMS designed medical institutions in Jiangsu, divide the results into groups and make a comparative analysis based on the relevant properties of rated agencies. Results: Compared to 2011, the credit level appraisal on NCMS medical institutions in Jiangsu is higher in 2012; the score of public medical institutions, medical institutions with inpatient department and the general hospitals are higher. The relevant indexes of correlation have significant difference, P≤0.05. Conclusion:Some low-credit medical institutions have disordered charge and over-increasing medical cost. The medical service management needs to be completed. It needs to further implement the management system of NCMS, discover more efficient payment of NCMS, enhance the supervision on private medical institutions, improve the introduction and training of talents and promote the standard and method of evaluation, so as to improve the sustainable development of NCMS.
2.The Reform of Japan ’ s Long-term Care Insurance Policy and the References
Lülin ZHOU ; Xiaotian ZHANG ; Wada YASUNORI
Chinese Health Economics 2013;(12):112-116
Through the reforming of public long-term care insurance, Japan has solved difficulties on the elderly care and provided positive experiences for the establishment of long-term care in China. The background , history and contents of long-term care insurance system are introduced. The establishment effects of the system are analyzed based on comparative method , reasonable suggestions of establishing long-term care insurance system in China are proposed combined with the national condition.
3.Research on the Influences of the Implementing Essential Medicine System on Compensation Mechanism of Primary Medical Institutions:analysis on system dynamics
Lülin ZHOU ; Feng JIN ; Changchun ZHAN
Chinese Health Economics 2013;(10):21-23
Objective: To analyze the influences of implementing essential medicine system on primary medical institutions and give suggestions. Methods: Using system dynamics method to construct the compensation mechanism model for primary medical institutions. Compare the growth in revenue and expenditure of primary medical institutions before and after essential medicine system implementation. Results: After the implement of essential medicine system, the growth in total expenditure and total income of primary medical institutions is steadier; when the annual growth rate of government financial subsidies invested more than 13%, the growth in total receipts will keep balance. Conclusion: It’s better to guarantee the government financial subsidies invested in time, raise medical service price properly and establish comprehensive compensation mechanism for implementing compensation mechanism of primary medical institutions.
4.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
5.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
6.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
7.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
8.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
9.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
10.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.