1.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
2.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
3.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
4.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
5.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
6.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
7.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
8.Multi-benefit Relations in Health Insurance Credit Senseless Payment:from Cooperative Game to Incentive Compatibility
Lülin ZHOU ; Zhiyuan CHEN ; Hanbin BAI
Chinese Health Economics 2024;43(6):40-43
Due to the cumbersome reimbursement process and inefficiency of the traditional medical process,health insurance credit senseless payment has become one of the ways for health insurance departments and designated medical institutions to improve the efficiency of payment and the convenience of patients'utilization of health insurance services.However,at the present stage,the relationship between multiple stakeholders in health insurance credit insensitive payment is still in the"cooperative game"mode of general public-private cooperation,which affects the effect of the implementation of health insurance credit insensitive payment.Therefore,it analyzes the cooperative game relationship between multiple interest subjects,and based on the theory of incentive compatibility,constructs the realization path from cooperative game to incentive compatibility of multiple interest subjects in health insurance credit insensitive payment,forming a three-dimensional mechanism of"cooperation constraint,incentive distribution,supervision and accountability",and promoting the construction of health insurance credit insensitive payment system and the realization of the policy objectives.
9.Effects of Medial Protrusio Technique of Total Hip Arthroplasty on Acetabular Cup in Adult Patient with Developmental Dysplasia of the Hip:A Finite Element Analysis
Xin ZHANG ; Wenjie LIN ; Bin HE ; Bolin FENG ; Haicong CHEN ; Huan ZHONG ; Hanbin OUYANG
Journal of Medical Biomechanics 2024;39(3):421-427
Objective To investigate the biomechanical effects of the medial protrusio technique on the acetabular cup in adult patients with developmental hip(DDH)after total hip arthroplasty.Methods The CT scanning data of bilateral hips from an adult patient with unilateral DDH were obtained further to develop a finite element model of the affected hemipelvis.The medial protrusio technique with various levels of medial protrusio was simulated,and the biomechanical differences between the medial protrusio and non-protrusio groups were evaluated.Results In the simulated pull-out test,the maximum anti-pull-out load strength of the non-protrusio group was 1 166 N.Compared with the non-protrusio group,the anti-pull-out load strength of the 4 mm and 8 mm medial protrusio groups increased by 45.8%and 57.1%,respectively.The peak micromotion at the cup-bone interface for the non-protrusio group was 166.4 μm in the standing phase of the gait cycle,and that of the 4 mm and 8 mm medial protrusio groups was decreased by 46.2%and 62.1%,respectively.Regarding the immediate stress distributions of periacetabular bone tissues following cup implantation,the differences between the groups were not significant.Under the loading condition of the standing phase,the non-protrusio group yielded the lowest average and peak stresses.The average stress increased with the level of medial protrusio,and the highest peak stress was observed in the 4 mm medial protrusio group.Conclusions The medial protrusio technique can improve the initial stability of the acetabular cup,and the initial stability is positively proportional to the protrusio level.However,owing to the concentration of marginal stress at the cup-bone interface,a minor medial protrusio cup with insufficient bone coverage might increase the risk of various prosthesis-related complications.
10.Analysisof HPV infection gene subtypes in the gynecology outpatient clinic of a hospital in Huadu district,Guangzhou
Siyi LI ; Hanbin HU ; Xueping LUO ; Weiwei HUANG ; Dongyun ZHU ; Xinyi CHEN
Modern Hospital 2024;24(5):803-805,809
Purpose To analyze the gene subtypes and characteristics of human papilloma virus(HPV)infection among women attending outpatient and physical examination centers at our hospital.Methods We utilized Polymerase Chain Reaction(PCR)combined with reverse dot hybridization to detect 28 HPV gene subtypes.Results HPV infection rate among the women was 24.15%.The five most prevalent high-risk(HR)and low-risk(LR)HPV gene subtypes were HPV 52,16,53,58,39,and HPV 61,81,54,42,44,respectively.Single and double infections accounted for 68.97%and 20.72%,with no signifi-cant difference found in the combination of multiple infection types.When stratified by age,the highest HPV infection rate was found among the group aged ≤25 years,followed by the group aged ≥66 years and then the group aged 56-65 years.This pattern of HPV infection rates across age groups revealed an approximate U-shaped curve.Conclusion The majority of female HPV in-fections in Huadu district are single infections,primarily affecting young and middle-aged women.HPV gene subtypes exhibit the characteristics of population or region-specific distribution.The overall infection rate of HPV is 24.15%,with the most common types being 52,16,and 53.The three peak age groups for HPV infection ranges are ≤25 years,56-65 years,and ≥66 years.

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