The 2010 Victorian influenza season was characterized by normal seasonal influenza activity and the dominance of the pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 strain. General Practice Sentinel Surveillance rates peaked at 9.4 ILI cases per 1000 consultations in week 36 for metropolitan practices, and at 10.5 ILI cases per 1000 in the following week for rural practices. Of the 678 ILI cases, 23% were vaccinated, a significantly higher percentage than in previous years. A significantly higher percentage of ILI patients were swabbed in 2010 compared to 2003–2008, but similar to 2009, with a similar percentage being positive for influenza as in previous years. Vaccination rates increased with patient age. Melbourne Medical Deputising Service rates peaked in week 35 at 19.1 ILI cases per 1000 consultations. Of the 1914 cases of influenza notified to the Department of Health, Victoria, 1812 (95%) were influenza A infections – 1001 (55%) pandemic A(H1N1) 2009, 4 (<  1%) A(H3N2) and 807 (45%) not subtyped; 88 (5%) were influenza B; and 14 (<  1%) were influenza A and B co-infections. The World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza tested 403 isolates of which 261 were positive for influenza, 250 of which were influenza A and 11 were influenza B. Ninety-two per cent of the influenza A viruses were pandemic A(H1N1) 2009, and following antigenic analysis all of these were found to be similar to the current vaccine strain. Three viruses (0.9%) were found to be oseltamivir resistant due to an H275Y mutation in the neuraminidase gene.

Objective：To assess the magnitude and severity of the 2012 influenza season in Victoria, Australia using surveillance data from five sources.Methods：Data from influenza notifications, sentinel general practices, a sentinel hospital network, a sentinel locum service and strain typing databases for 2012 were descriptively analysed.Results：Influenza and influenza-like illness activity was moderate compared to previous years, although a considerable increase in notified laboratory-confirmed influenza was observed. Type A influenza comprised between 83% and 87% of cases from the general practitioners, hospitals and notifiable surveillance data. Influenza A/H3 was dominant in July and August, and most tested isolates were antigenically similar to the A/Perth/16/2009 virus used in the vaccine. There was a smaller peak of influenza type B in September. No tested viruses were resistant to any neuraminidase inhibitor antivirals. Higher proportions of type A/H3, hospitalized cases and those with a comorbid condition indicated for influenza vaccination were aged 65 years or older. Influenza vaccination coverage among influenza-like illness patients was 24% in sentinel general practices and 50% in hospitals.Discussion：The 2012 influenza season in Victoria was average compared to previous years, with an increased dominance of A/H3 accompanied by increases in older and hospitalized cases. Differences in magnitude and the epidemiological profile of cases detected by the different data sources demonstrate the importance of using a range of surveillance data to assess the relative severity of influenza seasons.

OBJECTIVE: To describe a 2010 outbreak of nine cases of measles in Australia possibly linked to an index case who travelled on an international flight from South Africa while infectious.

METHODS: Three Australian state health departments, Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales, were responsible for the investigation and management of this outbreak, following Australian public health guidelines. Results: An outbreak of measles occurred in Australia after an infectious case arrived on a 12-hour flight from South Africa. Only one of four cases in the first generation exposed to the index case en route was sitting within the two rows recommended for contact tracing in Australian and other guidelines. The remaining four cases in subsequent generations, including two health care workers, were acquired in health care settings. Seven cases were young adults. Delays in diagnosis and notification hampered disease control and contact tracing efforts.

CONCLUSION: Review of current contact tracing guidelines following in-flight exposure to an infectious measles case is required. Alternative strategies could include expanding routine contact tracing beyond the two rows on either side of the case’s row or expansion on a case-by-case basis depending on cabin layout and case and contact movements in flight. Releasing information about the incident by press release or providing generic information to everyone on the flight using e-mail or text messaging information obtained from the relevant airline, may also be worthy of consideration. Disease importation, inadequately vaccinated young adults and health care-related transmission remain challenges for measles control in an elimination era.