Research on the doctors′ willingness of working at primary institutions and the economic incentive effect from the perspective of mental account
10.3760/cma.j.cn111325-20220125-00063
- VernacularTitle:心理账户视角下医生下沉基层倾向和经济激励效应研究
- Author:
Yingbei XIONG
1
;
Lu LI
;
Kai XU
;
Jieming CHEN
;
Kunhe LIN
;
Zhengdong ZHONG
;
Xiao LIU
;
Jin ZHOU
;
Li XIANG
Author Information
1. 国家医疗保障研究院华科基地 华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院，武汉 430030
- Keywords:
Health human resources;
Mental account;
Resource to the primary;
Economic incentives;
Medical alliance
- From:
Chinese Journal of Hospital Administration
2022;38(7):500-504
- CountryChina
- Language:Chinese
-
Abstract:
Objective:To understand the incentive effect and influencing factors of the current economic incentive policy for medical alliances in Longhua District of Shenzhen(the alliance for short) on doctors′ willingness to work at primary medical institutions(the primary for short) from the perspective of mental account, and to explore the economic incentive effect of different economic incentive distribution methods on doctors′ willingness to work at the primary.Methods:The questionnaire was designed based on mental account theory. Random sampling was made in November 2019 for a questionnaire survey among doctors in two district-level medical institutions of the alliance in Longhua District of Shenzhen. The purpose was to analyze their inclination to work at the primary and their selection preferences for economic incentive distribution methods under the current economic incentive policy. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, and the influencing factors of doctors′ willingness to work at the primary were analyzed by χ2 test and binary logistic regression. Results:A total of 254 valid questionnaires were collected with an effective recovery rate of 90.7%. Among the respondents, 189(74.4%) were willing to work at the primary, 168(66.1%) chose to receive the economic incentives specifically for working at the primary, and 148 people(58.3%) hoped to receive such economic incentives immediately. Education background, self-rated economic income level of doctors and different payment methods of economic incentive for working at the primary had significant effects on their willingness to work at the primary( P<0.05). Conclusions:The current economic incentive policy of the alliance can meet the demands for economic incentives in terms of doctors′ material accounts, and doctors′ overall inclination to work at the primary was strong. If the amount of economic incentives is constant, doctors preferred to receive the economic incentives specifically, mainly affected by income accounts and additional income accounts. In addition, education and self-assessment of economic income level were important factors affecting the willingness of doctors to work at the primary, which may be affected by mental accounts other than material accounts.
