Research on Multi-stage Constraint Gaming with the Moral Hazard from the Supply Side in Public Hospitals of China
10.7664/CHE20170606
- VernacularTitle:我国公立医院供方道德风险约束的多阶段动态博弈研究
- Author:
Qiaoli WANG
- Keywords:
public hospital;
moral hazard of the supply side;
constraint mechanism;
dynamic gaming model
- From:
Chinese Health Economics
2017;36(6):20-22
- CountryChina
- Language:Chinese
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Abstract:
Objective:To discuss the constraint mechanism of moral hazard from the supply side in the medical market of China.Methods:It analyzed the effectiveness of government regulation and of the influencing factors of the doctors and patients expected profits through the establishment 4 stage dynamic game model involved the doctors,patients and the government as the subject.Results:In the case of other conditions unchanged,the effective probability of government regulation would increase with the increase of profits made by excessive medical treatment,but would decrease with the increase of doctor's punishment cost and the increase of doctor's reputation value.Given the reasonable probability about medical treatment,the doctor's expected profits would increase with the increase of the value of a reasonable medical gain and doctor's reputation increase.The prospective profits of patients would increase as the doctor's profits increased,but decrease with the over-increased medical treatment.Conclusion:The effective restraint mechanism of moral hazard from the supply side of public hospitals in China included relax the price control,improve the market value of medical services,form effective doctor reputation incentive mechanism,reduce government supervision costs and improve government regulation on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility.
