A Case-Study of Implementation of Improved Strategies for Prevention of Laboratory-acquired Brucellosis.
10.1016/j.shaw.2015.07.009
- Author:
Louisa J CASTRODALE
1
;
Gregory A RACZNIAK
;
Karen M RUDOLPH
;
Lori CHIKOYAK
;
Russell S COX
;
Tricia L FRANKLIN
;
Rita M TRAXLER
;
Marta GUERRA
Author Information
1. Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Public Health, Anchorage, AK, USA. louisa.castrodale@alaska.gov
- Publication Type:Brief Communication
- Keywords:
Alaska;
brucellosis;
laboratory-acquired infections;
laboratory-associated brucellosis;
laboratory biosafety
- MeSH:
Alaska;
Appointments and Schedules;
Brucella suis;
Brucellosis*;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.);
Classification;
Compliance;
Decision Making;
Epidemiology;
Follow-Up Studies;
Humans
- From:Safety and Health at Work
2015;6(4):353-356
- CountryRepublic of Korea
- Language:English
-
Abstract:
BACKGROUND: In 2012, the Alaska Section of Epidemiology investigated personnel potentially exposed to a Brucella suis isolate as it transited through three laboratories. METHODS: We summarize the first implementation of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2013 revised recommendations for monitoring such exposures: (1) risk classification; (2) antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis; (3) serologic monitoring; and (4) symptom surveillance. RESULTS: Over 30 people were assessed for exposure and subsequently monitored for development of illness. No cases of laboratory-associated brucellosis occurred. Changes were made to gaps in laboratory biosafety practices that had been identified in the investigation. CONCLUSION: Achieving full compliance for the precise schedule of serologic monitoring was challenging and resource intensive for the laboratory performing testing. More refined exposure assessments could inform decision making for follow-up to maximize likelihood of detecting persons at risk while not overtaxing resources.
