Study on the transformation mechanism between medical insurance payment and physician salary incentives:Evidence from experiment study under DRG
10.3969/j.issn.1674-2982.2024.07.002
- VernacularTitle:医保支付与医生薪酬的激励转化机制研究
- Author:
Xing LI
1
;
Xing LIN
;
Wen-Ting LIU
;
You-Li HAN
Author Information
1. 首都医科大学公共卫生学院 北京 100069
- Keywords:
Medical insurance payment;
Diagnosis-related groups(DRG);
Physicians'behavior;
Experiment study
- From:
Chinese Journal of Health Policy
2024;17(7):8-17
- CountryChina
- Language:Chinese
-
Abstract:
Objective:This study explored the designs of physicians'compensation incentives that were compatible with the reform of Diagnosis-related groups(DRG)payment,so as to provide a reference for optimizing policies related to medical insurance payment reform.Methods:We designed seven different physicians'compensation schemes that converted DRG payment incentives into salary incentives,using economic experiments.The total of 210 medical students and 65 doctors were recruited as subjects.We tested the quantity of medical services for patients that participants provided and the corresponding patient health benefits under different incentive schemes.Results:The two designs of feedback of DRG payment to physicians and linking DRG payment surplus to physicians'performance wages both could transmit the incentive of the payment methods to the service providers.On this basis,a quality-based pay-for-performance payment was introduced,and the deviation between the quantity of services provided by subjects and the optimal quantity of services decreased,and the loss ratio of patient health benefits also decreased.Conclusion:When transmitting DRG payment incentives to medical service providers,the physician compensation design combined with quality-based pay-for-performance payments is more conducive to improving patient health benefits.
